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Micheline Gleixner*  Consumer Credit in Canada:  A Regulatory
 Patchwork
With unlimited access and consequent increased use of consumer credit in Canada 
and the federal government’s gradual abandonment of consumer credit regulation 
since Confederation, Provinces and Territories have progressively enacted 
provincial consumer protection legislation aiming to regulate the consumer credit 
industry and protect vulnerable consumers.
A review of current provincial and territorial legislative frameworks governing 
consumer credit reveals significant discrepancies and limitations. Given the 
expansion of the consumer credit industry and the inherent vulnerability of 
consumers, the article confirms the need and urgency of strengthening financial 
consumer protection and provides possible avenues of reform. 
It is recommended that Parliament reassert its paramount federal jurisdiction over 
interest to implement a national comprehensive consumer credit framework in 
order to promote a sustainable and responsible credit industry while ensuring that 
Canadian consumers are not only better protected from abusive and predatory 
lending practices but better equipped to increase their financial health and well-
being. 
Vu l’accès illimité au crédit à la consommation et son utilisation accrue qui en 
résulte au Canada, et compte tenu de l’abandon progressif par le gouvernement 
fédéral de toute réglementation à cet égard depuis le début de la Confédération, 
les provinces et territoires ont progressivement adopté des lois provinciales et 
territoriales de protection des consommateurs visant à réglementer le secteur du 
crédit à la consommation et à protéger les consommateurs vulnérables.  
Un examen des cadres législatifs provinciaux et territoriaux actuels régissant 
le crédit à la consommation révèle des divergences et des limites importantes. 
Compte tenu de l’expansion du secteur du crédit à la consommation et de la 
vulnérabilité inhérente des consommateurs, le présent article confirme la nécessité 
et l’urgence de renforcer la protection financière des consommateurs et propose 
des pistes de réforme possibles. 
Il est recommandé que le Parlement réaffirme sa compétence fédérale 
prépondérante sur la question des intérêts afin de mettre en œuvre un cadre national 
complet en matière de crédit à la consommation et de promouvoir un secteur 
du crédit durable et responsable tout en veillant à ce que les consommateurs 
canadiens soient non seulement mieux protégés contre les pratiques de prêt 
abusives et usuraires, mais aussi mieux équipés pour accroître leur santé et leur 
bien-être financiers.
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fulfillment of the requirements for the PhD Program in the Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie 
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It now has been recognized almost universally by scholars, judges, 
legislators and even the consumer credit industry that measures must be 
taken by society to avoid the socially unacceptable consequences which 
too often are by-products of an unregulated consumer credit market.1
Introduction
Given the historical negative connotations associated with usury and the 
personal use of credit, consumer credit was initially limited and scarce in 
Canada at Confederation in 1867. However, spawned by the Industrial 
Revolution in the 19th century, a new culture of consumerism has thrived 
since World War II and created an unabating demand for consumer products 
1. Ronald CC Cuming, “The Credit Consumer in Trouble: Remedies of Canadian Consumer 
Creditors” (1968) 15:1 McGill LJ 48 at 48.
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and services.2 Corresponding consumer spending has catalyzed in turn 
the development and growth of a new consumer credit industry.3 Still 
relevant today, consumer credit was defined in 1967 as “credit advanced 
to individuals to finance their expenditures on goods and services as 
consumers.”4 Financial innovation produced new and more accessible 
consumer credit products and services and now includes credit card loans, 
personal lines of credit, title loans, home equity loans, instalment loans, 
rent-to-own agreements, payday loans and other unsecured personal 
loans.5
Nevertheless, abusive and predatory practices of unscrupulous credit 
lenders, notably loan sharks, represented a continuing concern for policy 
makers.6 In fact, a review of early federal legislation reveals Parliament’s 
sustained effort to regulate money lending in Canada in order to protect 
vulnerable debtors from abusive lending practices.7 As a result, not only 
were usury and money lending regulated but also licensing and supervision 
of early loan companies were contemplated by federal legislation. 
Although early regulation of consumer credit was initially considered 
unnecessary legislative interference in the free market, it quickly 
represented the legitimization of a new industry and its acceptance by policy 
makers pursuant to new norms and values in North America. Analysis 
of small loan legislation enacted in the United States between 1915 and 
1925 confirmed that “the business of money lending has been brought into 
2. Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Saul Schwartz & Thomas GW Telfer, “A Retrospective on the Canada 
Consumer Bankruptcy System: 40 Years after the Tassé Report” (2011) 50 Can Bus LJ 236 at 240-
241; Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Consumer Credit 
and Cost of Living, Report on Consumer Credit (1967) (Joint Chairmen: The Honourable David 
A Croll and Ron Basford) at 10 [Special Joint Committee on Consumer Credit]; Jacob S Ziegel, 
“Consumer Credit Regulation: A Canadian Consumer-Oriented Viewpoint” (1968) 68:3 Colum L 
Rev 488 at 488 [Ziegel, “Consumer Credit Regulation”]; Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on 
Banking and Finance, vol 1 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1964) (Chair: Dana Harris Porter) at 203 [Royal 
Commission on Banking and Finance]; Ontario, Final Report of the Select Committee of the Ontario 
Legislature on Consumer Credit, 1965 at paras 56-59 [Ontario, Final Report 1965].
3. Mary Anne Waldron, The Law of Interest in Canada (Carswell: Toronto, 1992) at 11 [Waldron, 
The Law of Interest in Canada].
4. Special Joint Committee on Consumer Credit, supra note 2 at 25.
5. Bank of Canada, “Household Credit” (November 15, 2019), n 1, online: Bank of Canada <https://
credit.bankofcanada.ca/householdcredit> [https://perma.cc/39DA-4G5W]; Ben-Ishai, Schwartz & 
Telfer, supra note 2 at 241.
6. Jacob S Ziegel, “Recent Developments in Canadian Consumer Credit Law” (1973) 36:5 Mod L 
Rev 479 [Ziegel, “Recent Developments”].
7. Mary Anne Waldron, “The Federal Interest Act: It Sure is Broke, But is it Worth Fixin’?” (1997) 
29:2 Can Bus LJ 161 at 164 [Waldron, “The Federal Interest Act”]. See also An Act Respecting Interest, 
RSC 1886, c 127; Pawnbrokers Act, RSC 1886, c 128; An Act Respecting Loans in Canada by British 
Companies, RSC 1886, c 125; Companies Act, RSC 1886, c 119, ss 86-103 [Loan Companies Act, 
1886]; An Act respecting Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, RSC 1886 c 123; The Bank Act, 
RSC 1886, c 120.
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the light, has changed from an underhanded, semi-legal enterprise which 
the world stigmatized as loan shark to that of an honorable, commercial 
venture.”8 As Iain Ramsay observed, federal money lending legislation 
recognized the “legitimacy of the industry, making it extremely difficult to 
de-legitimise it.”9
Since 1969, consistent and sustained statistics recorded by the Bank 
of Canada have clearly established the resulting expansion of consumer 
credit in Canada.10 Already totalling 9.7 billion dollars in 1969, consumer 
credit increased 322% between 1969 and 1979. Fuelled by the global 
financial liberalization and deregulation of financial services during the 
1980s,11 consumer credit in Canada further increased by 325% and 270% 
during the next two twenty-year periods culminating in a total amount of 
639.4 billion dollars fifty years later in 2019. Moreover, total household 
indebtedness in Canada has surged to a staggering amount of 2.24 trillion 
dollars when consumer credit is combined with residential mortgage 
credit. According to the Bank of Canada, the most recent expansion of 
household debt is the result of higher house prices, financial innovation, 
income growth and low interest rates.12 
As previously confirmed by the Royal Commission on Banking and 
Finance in 1964,13 household spending, including the escalating use of 
consumer credit, remains an important driver of modern economies.14 
However, in the event fallouts, possibly resulting from a sharp rise in 
8. “Current Legislation: The Uniform Small Loan Law” (1923) 23:5 Colum L Rev 484 at 487. 
See also Anne Fleming, City of Debtors: A Century of Fringe Finance (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2018) at 47-77.
9. lain Ramsay, “Of Payday Loans and Usury: Further Thoughts” (2003) 38:3 Can Bus LJ 386 at 
390 [Ramsay, “Payday Loans”].
10. Statistics Canada, “Table 10-10-0118-01, Credit measures, Bank of Canada (x 1,000,000)” (last 
modified 23 February 2020), unadjusted, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25318/1010011801-eng> [https://
perma.cc/E4HS-Z97G].
11. Donald JS Brean, “Financial Liberalization in Canada: Historical, Institutional and Economic 
Perspectives” in Albert Berry & Gustavo Indart, eds, Critical Issues in International Financial Reform 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003) 125 at 135: “[B]y 1980 Canada had entered—or 
had been forced into—a new era of finance. Finance was being liberalized. The forces of change shaping 
industry and commerce—advances in technology, transportation, communications, international 
economic integration, financial sophistication—were likewise shaping the Canadian financial sector 
and the regulations that govern it.” See also Iain Ramsay, “Overindebtedness and Regulation of 
Consumer Credit” in Thierry Bourgoignie, ed, Regards croisés sur les enjeux contemporains du droit 
de la consommation (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2006) at 35 [Ramsay, “Overindebtedness”]. 
12. Allan Crawford & Umar Faruqui, “What Explains Trends in Household Debt in Canada?” 
(Winter 2011–2012) Bank Can Rev 3 at 3, 13.
13. Royal Commission on Banking and Finance, supra note 2 at 14.
14. Anson TY Ho et al, “Home Equity Extraction and Household Spending in Canada” (September 
2019), online: Bank of Canada <www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/09/staff-analytical-note-2019-27/> 
[https://perma.cc/YN48-LCU3]; Special Joint Committee on Consumer Credit, supra note 2 at 61-63. 
See also Ramsay, “Overindebtedness,” supra note 11 at 35. 
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interest rates or a decline in employment rates or real estate prices, trigger 
an economic downturn, the elevated level of household indebtedness also 
represents a significant vulnerability for the Canadian financial system 
and economy.15 On an individual level, sudden financial shocks, such 
as loss of income, illness, family breakdown or a rise in interest rates, 
represent potential vulnerabilities to a consumer’s ability to service 
his or her household debt. Along with the financial distress caused 
by overindebtedness, the social impact of consumer credit has long 
been recognized: “Overindebtedness creates social costs such as lower 
productivity, family problems, health problems and potential financial 
exclusion. These costs are not reflected in the price of credit.”16 
Moreover, given the newly discovered profitability of the industry, 
many modern lending practices specifically target vulnerable consumers, 
especially low-income, uneducated or financially distressed debtors 
marginalized by mainstream financial institutions.17 Financial exclusion 
from traditional financial services stems from various factors either 
individually or in combination. Lack of access, either knowledge-based, 
cost-based or geographically-based, constitutes a major obstacle for some 
consumers while rejection, either actual or anticipated, resulting from 
the absence of credit, a poor credit rating, or an existing high level of 
indebtedness, represents another barrier to affordable credit-enhancing 
consumer loans.18
However, with the federal government’s gradual abandonment of 
consumer credit regulation since Confederation, as will be explained in 
15. Bank of Canada, “Financial System Review—2019” (2019) at 6, online (pdf): Bank of Canada 
<www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/05/financial-system-review-2019/> [https://perma.cc/NG6M-8W8J]; 
Gino Cateau, Tom Roberts & Jie Zhou, “Indebted Households and Potential Vulnerabilities for the 
Canadian Financial System: A Microdata Analysis” (Report) in Bank of Canada, Financial System 
Review (December 2015) at 49, online (pdf): <www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
fsr-december2015.pdf> [https://perma.cc/3592-MVHU]; Jerry Buckland, Hard Choices: Financial 
Exclusion, Fringe Banks, and Poverty in Urban Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2012) at 11 [Buckland, Hard Choices]; Poonam Puri & Andrew Nichol, “Developments in Financial 
Services Regulation: A Comparative Perspective” (2014) 55:3 Can Bus LJ 454 at 460. See also Livio 
Di Matteo, Household Debt and Government Debt in Canada (2017), online (pdf): Fraser Institute 
<www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/household-debt-and-government-debt.pdf> [https://
perma.cc/3B6V-VWSK].
16. Ramsay, “Overindebtedness,” supra note 11 at 37; Canada, Bankruptcy and Insolvency: Report 
of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation (Ottawa: Information Canada, 
1970) (Chair Roger Tassé) at paras 2.1.16-17; Ben-Ishai, Schwartz & Telfer, supra note 2 at 242.
17. Ben-Ishai, Schwartz & Telfer, supra note 2 at 243; Special Joint Committee on Consumer Credit, 
supra note 2 at 10, 17-18; Buckland, Hard Choices, supra note 15 at 152.
18. For further details see Brenda Spotton Visano, “Mainstream Financial Institution Alternatives to 
the Payday Loans” in Jerry Buckland, Chris Robinson & Brenda Spotton Visano, eds, Payday Lending 
in Canada in a Global Context: A Mature Industry with Chronic Challenges (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2018) at 149-158 [Buckland, Robinson & Visano, Payday Lending in Canada].
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Part I of this article, provinces have progressively enacted a vast array of 
provincial consumer protection legislation aiming to regulate the consumer 
credit industry and protect vulnerable consumers during the last sixty 
years. As a result, provinces and territories play a significant role in the 
regulation of matters related to pawnbroking, unconscionable transactions 
relief, cost of credit disclosure, fair trade practices, payday loans and 
other high-cost credit products. The evolution of these provincial statutes 
governing consumer credit will be explored chronologically in Part II.
Each subset of provincial consumer protection legislation has 
previously been the subject of in-depth analyses and Canadian studies, 
reports and publications are referenced throughout the paper. The objective 
of this article is not to provide a thorough update of previous research, 
although such an endeavour is certainly warranted, but instead to offer 
insight into the evolution and progression of financial consumer protection 
legislation in Canada and to provide the reader with a general overview of 
its current state in order to contextualize future reform. 
A review of the current provincial legislative framework governing 
consumer credit in Canada will ascertain the extent of such regulation 
and reveal various discrepancies and limitations. The analysis will 
further demonstrate that the apparent sporadic, disparate and fragmented 
nature of provincial consumer credit regulation reduces the effectiveness 
of consumer protection measures. With the expansion of the consumer 
credit industry and the inherent vulnerability of consumers, this article 
will confirm the need and urgency of strengthening financial consumer 
protection and provide possible avenues for reform.
Given the absence of a national cohesive strategy addressing the recent 
rise in consumer overindebtedness and insolvency,19 it is recommended 
that Parliament reassert its paramount federal jurisdiction over interest 
to implement a national comprehensive consumer credit framework, to 
promote a consumer credit industry that is both sustainable and responsible, 
while ensuring that Canadian consumers are not only better protected 
from abusive and predatory lending practices but also better equipped to 
increase their financial health and well-being.
19. Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, “Annual Consumer Insolvency Rates by 
Province and Economic Region” (last modified 24 May 2019), online: OSB <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/
site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br01820.html> [https://perma.cc/Y5R6-6GJ2] (according to the OSB statistics, 
consumer insolvencies have continued their upward trend since 1989 when we disregard the impact of 
the 2008–2009 financial crisis).
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I. The demise of federal consumer credit legislation
Pursuant to its exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter relating to 
“Interest” granted by the Constitution Act, 1867,20 Parliament gradually 
enacted national legislation dealing with interest and other credit related 
matters. Indeed, all of the current provisions of the federal Interest Act can 
be traced back to the late nineteenth century.21 The essential elements found 
in today’s Interest Act were added piecemeal over a twenty-year period 
between 1880 and 1900 and were never the subject of a comprehensive 
debate which examined all facets of the legislation at one time. 
The federal Act confirmed the general principle established in Canadian 
law since before Confederation that the parties to a loan transaction are free 
to fix their own interest rates unless legislative restrictions apply.22 The Act 
also sets the rate of interest at six per cent where none had been fixed by 
the parties or by law.  That rate was lowered to five per cent in 1900.23 
The result was a federal Interest Act that essentially ensures a borrower 
is informed of the applicable rate of interest but constitutes minimal and 
largely ineffectual disclosure requirements given that knowledge of the 
interest rate is but one part of the equation.24 
Comprehension and uniformity are also required in order to make an 
informed decision and to properly compare different financial options.25 
Unfortunately, both objectives were never achieved by this Act. Given the 
lack of financial literacy of many Canadians, the complexity of financial 
documents and the absence of a truly encompassing definition of interest 
as the entire cost of credit, lenders were never obliged to disclose and often 
times misrepresented the total cost of the loan to the consumer. Today 
the legislation has been described as “hopelessly dated” with “antiquated 
provisions” and “functionally dead.”26
20. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91(19), reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, 
No 5.
21. Interest Act, CSC 1858 (22 Vict) c 58; RSC 1886, c 127, ss 1, 2 (ss 9-30 repealed SC 1890, c 34); 
RSC 1906, c 120 (s 4 disclosure requirement added by SC 1897, s 2); RSC 1927, c 102; RSC 1952, 
c 156; RSC 1970, c I-18; RSC 1985, c I-15; See also Waldron, The Law of Interest in Canada, supra 
note 3 at 5-10; Waldron, “The Federal Interest Act,” supra note 7 at 164.
22. Interest Act, supra note 21, ss 2-3. 
23. An Act to amend the Acts respecting Interest, SC 1900, c 29, s 1.
24. Ziegel, “Recent Developments,” supra note 6 at 479-495.
25. Waldron, The Law of Interest in Canada, supra note 3 at 96-97.
26. Harvin Pitch, “Consumer Credit Reform: The Case for a Renewed Federal Initiative” (1971–
1972) 5:2 Ottawa L Rev 324 at 325; Thomas GW Telfer, “Preliminary Background Paper on the 
Canada Interest Act” (Report prepared for the Uniform Law Conference of Canada Annual Conference, 
Charlottetown, September 2007) at para 1, online: <ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1263&
context=lawpub> [https://perma.cc/4QHD-DUDG], citing Jacob S Ziegel, “Is Canadian Consumer 
Law Dead?” (1994–1995), 24:3 Can Bus LJ 417 at 421 and Waldron, “The Federal Interest Act,” 
supra note 7 at 162. 
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Parliament’s first efforts to regulate the consumer credit industry 
included the Pawnbrokers Act27 and the Money Lenders Act.28 The latter 
regulated small money lenders and limited rates of interest to twelve 
per cent per annum on loans under $500. In addition, the federal Loan 
Companies Act consolidated previous licensing requirements and 
prescribed in 1934 an overriding interest rate ceiling of 2.5% per month on 
all lending companies operating under powers granted by the Parliament 
of Canada.29 However, despite the above federal legislation, regulation of 
interest rates in existing statutes did not protect vulnerable debtors from 
other usurious charges given their “simplistic approach and the absence 
of a licensing requirement” for non-federally regulated money lenders.30 
The Money Lenders Act was deemed unenforceable and thus ineffective 
because “no one was fixed with responsibility for its administration” and 
the absence of a definition of “interest” hindered any possible prosecution 
under the statute.31 According to Mary Anne Waldron, “[l]enders were 
evidently quick to understand that a variety of fees and charges could be 
added to the borrower’s bill and increase their return.”32
As a result, the Small Loans Act was enacted in 1939 and applied 
generally to all loans of less than $500 whether the money lender was 
federally or provincially incorporated. It limited interest to two per cent 
per month on a loan for a period of fifteen months or less and to one per 
cent per month for loans with longer durations.33 Although it provided 
initially the necessary legislative framework to a developing consumer 
27. Pawnbrokers Act, SC 1851 (14 & 15 Vict) c 82; CSC 1859, c 61; RSC 1886, c 128; RSC 1906, 
c 121; RSC 1927, c 152; RSC 1952, c 204; RSC 1970, c P-5 as repealed by Miscellaneous Statute 
Repeal Act, SC 1980–1983, c 159, (in force 1 December 1983, and replaced in part by the usury 
provisions of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 347). 
28. The Money Lenders Act, 1906, SC 1906, c 32; RSC 1906, c 122; RSC 1927, c 135, as repealed 
by An Act to amend the Small Loans Act, SC 1956, c 46, s 8 (in force upon assent 14 August 1956) 
[Money Lenders Act].
29. Loan Companies Act, 1886, supra note 7; The Loan Companies Act, Canada, 1899, SC 1899, 
c 41; Companies Act, RSC 1906, c 79, ss 177-258 (Loan Companies); Loan Companies Act, SC 1914, 
c 40; RSC 1927, c 27; RSC 1952, c 170; RSC 1970, c L-12; RSC 1985, c L-12.
30. Waldron, The Law of Interest in Canada, supra note 3 at 11-12; Jacob S Ziegel, “The Legal 
Regulation of Consumer Credit in Canada” (1966) 31:2 Sask Bar Rev 103 at 106 [Ziegel, “Legal 
Regulation”]; Small Loans Act, SC 1939, c 23, Preamble; 2nd reading, House of Commons Debates, 
18-4, vol 3 (25 April 1939) at 3203-3207 (Hon JL Ilsley); William E Thomson Associates Inc v 
Carpenter (1989), 69 OR (2d) 545 (CA); Jacob Ziegel, “Time to clarify Canada’s lending law,” The 
Globe and Mail (20 April 2004, last modified 20 April 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.
com/opinion/time-to-clarify-canadas-lending-law/article1136034/> [https://perma.cc/X6MA-9Q46].
31. Special Joint Committee on Consumer Credit, supra note 2 at 30-31; Waldron, The Law of 
Interest in Canada, supra note 3 at 11-12. See e.g. R v Climans, [1938] 2 DLR 711 at para 17, 69 CCC 
336 (Ont Co Ct).
32. Mary Anne Waldron, “A Brief History of Interest Caps in Canadian Consumer Lending: Have 
We Learned Enough from the Past?” (2011) 50 Can Bus LJ 300 at 303 [Waldron, “A Brief History”].
33. The Small Loans Act, 1939, SC 1939, c 23, s 2 (in force on 1 January 1940).
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credit industry and applied to all loan companies whether provincially 
or federally incorporated, the graduated rate ceilings prescribed quickly 
became totally “unrealistic” and the Act was “totally inadequate” given 
the rapid escalating cost of money as well as the increased demand for and 
access to consumer credit.34 Even though the monetary ceiling of $500 of 
the Small Loans Act was increased in 195635 to $1,500, this restriction had 
become an insubstantially low ceiling and thus easily evaded.36 With this 
last amendment, interest was permitted up to two per cent per month on 
the first $300, one per cent per month on the amount between $300 and 
$1,000 and 0.5% per month on the amount between $1,000 and $1,500 
on loans by money lenders. According to the 1964 Royal Commission on 
Banking and Finance, the statute became ineffective and even created a 
distortion in the availability of small loans within the regulated field since 
“there [was] no regulation of the substantial amount of larger lending.”37 
Moreover, inadequate enforcement of the federal statute is confirmed by 
the fact that “[b]etween 1940, when the Act came into force, and 1966 
there were only 9 prosecutions under the Small Loans Act.”38
During World War II, the federal government granted jurisdiction over 
consumer credit and instalment buying to the Wartime Prices and Trade 
Board.39 The Board introduced the first consumer credit order in 1941 
and restricted the purchase of goods under terms of deferred payment by 
prescribing a down payment of thirty-three per cent on specified articles 
along with a minimum $10 payment and limiting the credit period of an 
instalment account.40 According to the Board’s 1943 Report, the primary 
objective of these regulations was to curb inflation and prices “through 
34. Pitch, supra note 26 at 325; Canada, Royal Commission on Prices, Minutes of Proceedings and 
Evidence, No 35 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1948) at 1910–1912 [Royal Commission on Prices, Minutes 
No 35]. The temporary success of the Small Loans Act is highlighted in Special Joint Committee on 
Consumer Credit, supra note 2 at 55; Jacob Ziegel, “Consumer Insolvencies, Consumer Credit and 
Responsible Lending” in Janis P Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2009 (Toronto: Carswell, 
2010) at 355-356 [Ziegel, “Consumer Insolvencies”].
35. An Act to amend the Small Loans Act, SC 1956, c 46, ss 1, 6.
36.  Ziegel, “Consumer Credit Regulation,” supra note 2 at 496; Waldron, The Law of Interest in 
Canada, supra note 3 at 16; Waldron, “A Brief History,” supra note 32 at 305-306; Special Joint 
Committee on Consumer Credit, supra note 2 at 31; Royal Commission on Banking and Finance, 
supra note 2 at 382. Both federal reports recommended an increase of the maximum amount of the 
regulated loan from $1,500 to $5,000.
37. Royal Commission on Banking and Finance, supra note 2 at 209-210; Waldron, The Law of 
Interest in Canada, supra note 3 at 16.
38. Ziegel, “Consumer Credit Regulation,” supra note 2 at n 181. See also Ziegel, “Legal 
Regulation,” supra note 30 at 107.
39. War Measures Act, RSC 1927, c 206; Wartime Prices and Trade Board Regulations, PC 1941-
6834, (28 August 1941) C Gaz Extra (4 September 1941), s 4(1)(g).
40. Canada, Wartime Prices and Trade Board, Order 64 (14 October 1941).
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a curtailment in the volume of floating credit” and an increase of cash 
sales.41
Until the regulations were revoked in 1947 following the war, the 
Board regularly refined and extended the wartime federal consumer credit 
regulations.42 Several of these changes were further “designed to ensure 
that the real cost of extending credit would be both paid and realized by 
those making use of this additional service.”43 
A subsequent national experience to regulate consumer credit 
came during the Korean War, to “take steps to restrain the expansion of 
purchasing power and the demand for consumer goods by preventing 
inflationary expansion of currency and credit.”44 The regulation adopted 
in 1950 and revoked in 1952 provided for minimum down payments 
and maximum loan values (twenty to fifty per cent of cash price of the 
goods sold), maximum periods of credit (12 to 18 months) and minimum 
instalment amounts ($5 to $10 per month).45
Fifteen years later, with the entry of federal banks into the consumer 
credit market following the liberalization of interest rate caps previously 
imposed on banks,46 Parliament adopted limited banking disclosure 
and transparency requirements in 1967 pursuant to the Bank Act 
41. Canada, Report of the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, September 3 1939, to March 31 1943, 
at 5-6: “It also had the effect of conserving labour and critical materials through reduced consumer 
demand; reducing the costs of doing business arising from bad debts, interest and book-keeping 
expenses; reducing the volume of outstanding debt of individuals; and accumulating a backlog of 
demand for industrial products for a later period when labour and materials will again be readily 
available for civilian needs” [WPTB Report, 1939–1943].
42. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Prices, vol 3 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1949) (Chair: 
Clifford Austin Curtis) at 289-291 [Royal Commission on Prices, Report]; Royal Commission on 
Prices, Minutes No 35, supra note 34 at 1874-1875. See Canada, Wartime Prices and Trade Board, 
Order 75 (30 December 1941); Order 87 (19 January 1942); Order 161 (23 July 1942, effective 
1 August 1942); Order 225 (12 January 1943, effective 1 February 1943); Order 471 (effective 
January 1945); Order 598 (30 January 1946); Order 622 (16 April 1946); Order 692, SOR/47-35 (11 
January 1947, effective 13 January 1947). See also Canada, Report of the Wartime Prices and Trade 
Board, January 1, 1946, to December 31, 1946 (including important developments up to February 
1, 1947) (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1947) at 9: “In view of improving supplies and of the heavy task 
of administration which would have been involved in appropriately adapting the application of these 
regulations to the changing conditions of supply and demand, the Government did not feel justified in 
continuing them under its emergency powers.”
43. WPTB Report, 1939–1943, supra note 41 at 56.
44. The Consumer Credit (Temporary Provisions) Act, SC 1950–1951, c 3, as amended by SC 1951, 
c 14, expired on 31 July 1953, SOR/52-222, as repealed by Miscellaneous Statute Repeal Act, SC 
1980–1983, c 159. 
45. The Consumer Credit Regulations, SOR/50-485 substituted by SOR/51-3 as amended by 
SOR/51-94 and SOR/51-333 (revoked 6 May 1952, SOR/52-191).
46. An Act Respecting Banks, SC 1867, c 11, s 17 (reduced to 6% in 1944 by The Bank Act, SC 1944, 
c 30, s 91 as amended by Bank Act, SC 1966–1967, c 87, ss 91(2)–(8), expired 31 December 1967, 
pursuant to SOR/67-329.
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and its constitutional jurisdiction over matters relating to banking.47 
Notwithstanding these new consumer protection measures, the report of 
the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on 
Consumer Credit and Cost of Living conclusively confirmed that same 
year that consumer credit remained a problem and that federal legislation 
“leaves much to be desired.”48 
Following unsuccessful attempts to further regulate consumer credit 
during the 1960s and 1970s,49 Parliament hastily repealed the Small Loans 
Act in 1980 without any debate or plan to protect consumers50 and replaced 
it with a criminal interest rate defined as an effective annual rate of interest 
that exceeds sixty per cent on the credit advanced under an agreement.51 
Consequently, with the exception of a short period during which the Small 
Loans Act was economically relevant, initial federal legislation was a 
dismal failure from a consumer protection perspective.52 
With the evident loopholes and the lack of enforcement, the absence of 
a federal licensing requirement for all money lenders as well as the impact 
of inflation and the absence any substantive reform, consumer credit in 
Canada was essentially unregulated for nearly 100 years.53 Although 
there was an unsuccessful attempt in the 1970s, no other comprehensive 
financial consumer protection legislation reform has been introduced to 
date by the federal government to regulate all forms of credit products and 
services or all types of credit grantors including provincially regulated 
companies.
It bears noting that federal regulation has substantially expanded during 
the last fifty years and now regulates all forms of consumer credit and other 
financial services offered by all federally regulated financial institutions.54 
47. Bank Act, SC 1966–1967, c 87, s 92; Pitch, supra note 26 at 327. See also Canada, Bill S-2, 
Finance Charges (Disclosure) Bill, 5th Sess, 24th Parl, 1962, reintroduced, Bill S-3, 25th Parl, 1962.
48. Special Joint Committee on Consumer Credit, supra note 2 at 8.
49. See in particular Bill C-16, An Act to provide for the protection of borrowers and depositors, 
to regulate interest on judgment debts, to repeal the Interest Act, the Pawnbrokers Act and the Small 
Loans Act and to amend certain other statutes in consequence thereof, 2nd Sess, 30th Parl, 1976.
50. Jacob S Ziegel, “Bill C-44: Repeal of the Small Loans Act and Enactment of a New Usury Law,” 
in “Comments on Legislation and Judicial Decisions,” (1981) 59:1 Can Bar Rev 124 at 188; Nelson v 
CTC Mortgage Corp (1984), 16 DLR (4th) 139, [1985] 2 WWR 560 at para 7 aff’d [1986] 1 SCR 749.
51. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 347 [Criminal Code].
52. Special Joint Committee on Consumer Credit, supra note 2 at 32; Waldron, “A Brief History,” 
supra note 32 at 303-307.
53. Ziegel, “Legal Regulation,” supra note 30 at 106-107.
54. Cost of Borrowing (Authorized Foreign Banks) Regulations, SOR/2002-262; Cost of Borrowing 
(Banks) Regulations, SOR/2001-101; Cost of Borrowing (Canadian Insurance Companies) 
Regulations, SOR/2001-102; Cost of Borrowing (Foreign Insurance Companies) Regulations, 
SOR/2001-103; Cost of Borrowing (Trust and Loan Companies) Regulations, SOR/2001-104; Cost of 
Borrowing (Retail Associations) Regulations, SOR/2002-263 [Cost of Borrowing Regulations 2001].
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Given the limited scope of this article, focusing on provincial legislation, 
the author refers an interested reader to a complementary article analyzing 
past and current federal legislation regulating consumer credit in Canada.55
II. Provincial legislative response
It is against this backdrop of ineffective federal legislation that Canadian 
provinces, pursuant to provincial constitutional heads of power, enacted 
consumer credit and consumer protection legislation as matters relevant to 
the “Incorporation of Companies with Provincial Objects” and “Property 
and Civil Rights in the Province.”56 At first, many provinces enacted 
consumer protection provisions relating to the non-financial terms of 
credit agreements between buyers and vendors of goods and services. As 
described by Jacob Ziegel, matters relating to vendor’s credit as opposed 
to lender’s credit had long been determined to be within provincial 
jurisdiction.57 Consequently, matters relating to sales of goods such as 
conditional sales, conditions and warranties relating to vendor’s title and 
quality of goods as well as vendor’s and buyer’s rights and remedies were 
found throughout provincial legislation in Canada.58
In addition, provinces enacted various statutes regulating and licensing 
provincial companies carrying on the business of the lending of money 
such as legislation on pawnbroking, money lending and loan corporations, 
but with few consumer protection provisions.59 The notable exception 
was money-lending legislation enacted in Newfoundland and Ontario in 
1907 and 1912 respectively, which included provisions providing relief 
to debtors from unconscionable bargains with money lenders similar 
to England’s corresponding statute at the time.60 These statutes were, 
however, on questionable constitutional footing and were not enacted in 
other provinces. Given the exclusive and paramount federal constitutional 
55. Micheline Gleixner, “A Canadian Financial Consumer Protection Code: Is Canada Ready for 
Round Three?” in Janis P Sarra & Justice Barbara Romaine, eds, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 
2018 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2019) at 57 [Gleixner, “A Canadian Financial Consumer Protection 
Code”].
56. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 20, ss 92(11), 92(13).
57. Ziegel, “Legal Regulation,” supra note 30 at 104: “A loan of money involves the charging of 
interest, but the charge levied by the vendor in return for the privilege of permitting the buyer to pay 
for the goods over a period of time is not legally characterized as interest.”
58. Ibid at 108-111; Jacob S Ziegel, “Retail Instalment Sales Legislation: A Historical and 
Comparative Survey” (1962) 14:2 UTLJ 143 at 148 [Ziegel, “Retail Instalment”].
59. (NL) The Money Lenders Act, 1907, SN 1907, c 5; (NS) An Act relating to Loan Corporations, 
SNS 1904, c 4; (ON) The Ontario Money-Lenders Act, SO 1912, c 30; The Loan Corporations Act, 
SO 1897, c 38; (QC) An Act to amend the Quebec License Law, SQ 1905, c 13. For pawnbroking 
legislation see infra, note 94.
60. (NL) The Money Lenders Act,1907, supra note 59, s 3; (ON) The Ontario Money-Lenders Act, 
SO 1912, c 30, ss 5-6.
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jurisdiction over “Interest,” provincial legislation dealing specifically with 
interest, money lending and lender’s credit was initially considered ultra 
vires provincial jurisdiction.61 
Despite these constitutional issues, Québec enacted legislation 
regulating consumer credit in 1947. Similar to previous wartime federal 
consumer credit regulations, the main provisions of the Instalment Sales 
Act62 included limited disclosure requirements, a minimum down payment 
of fifteen per cent for consumer goods with a period of 6 to 24 months 
to repay depending upon the amount of the unpaid balance as well as a 
maximum interest rate of three quarters of one per cent of the total of the 
deferred balance each month of the contract term.63 Following Québec’s 
lead, other provinces such as Alberta, Manitoba and New Brunswick 
enacted similar legislation prior to 1963 relating to conditional sales and 
instalment sales, otherwise known as time sale agreements.64 
Considering the ineffectiveness of federal legislation and that efforts 
made to persuade the government to increase the monetary ceiling had 
failed following the 1956 reform of the federal Small Loans Act, the 
provinces were further forced to intervene for debtors of loans above 
$1,500 by adopting new forms of consumer protection measures to provide 
relief against unconscionable transactions.65 
Subsequently, a “veritable cornucopia”66 as described by Jacob Ziegel, 
of provincial financial consumer protection legislation began to be enacted 
following the Ontario (AG) v Barfried Enterprises Ltd decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada.67 Notwithstanding the existence of federal 
legislation on consumer credit since Confederation, the Supreme Court 
of Canada restrictively interpreted Parliament’s exclusive constitutional 
61. Lynch v The Canada NW Land Co (1891), 19 SCR 204 at 212; Board of Trustees of Lethbridge 
Northern Irrigation District v Independent Order of Foresters, [1940] AC 513 at paras 7-8, [1940] 2 
DLR 273; Reference as to the Validity of section 6 of the Farm Security Act, 1944, of the Province of 
Saskatchewan, [1947] SCR 394 at 399, 414.
62. An Act respecting instalment sales, SQ 1947, c 73 [Instalment Sales Act].
63. Royal Commission on Prices, Minutes No 35, supra note 34 at 1875; Ziegel, “Retail Instalment,” 
supra note 58 at 154-155.
64. (AB) The Credit and Loan Agreement Act, SA 1954, c 19; The Credit and Loan Agreements Act, 
RSA 1955, c 66; (MB) The Time Sale Agreement Act, SM 1962, c 76 as amended by SM 1963, c 87; 
(NB) An Act to Amend Chapter 152 of the Revised Statutes, 1927, The Conditional Sales Act, SNB 
1949, c 38, s 1 repealed by SNB 1959, c 35; see also Ziegel, “Retail Instalment,” supra note 58 at 155.
65. Ziegel, “Consumer Credit Regulation,” supra note 2 at 496.
66. Ibid at 489.
67. Ontario (AG) v Barfried Enterprises Ltd, [1963] SCR 570 at 579, 42 DLR (2d) 137 [Barfried 
Enterprises]. See a critique of this decision in Micheline Gleixner, “Reconsidering Legislative 
Competence over Consumer Credit in Canada” in Janis P Sarra & Justice Barbara Romaine, eds, 
Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2016 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2017) at 248-264 [Gleixner, 
“Reconsidering Legislative Competence”].
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jurisdiction over “Interest” and concluded, in 1963, that “interest” was 
not synonymous with the “cost of the loan.” As a result, the Ontario 
Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act providing unconscionable 
transactions relief for money lending contracts unrelated to any sales 
transaction was therefore determined to be legislation in relation to Property 
and Civil Rights and the Administration of Justice in the Province, rather 
than legislation in relation to “Interest.”68 In order to validate provincial 
consumer protection legislation, the majority of the Court concluded that 
the true nature and character of the contested statute did not relate to 
“Interest” but rather dealt with rights arising from contract and thus were 
within provincial jurisdiction.
As a result, all provinces enacted, between 1965 and 1976, some form 
of consumer credit or consumer protection legislation as well as legislation 
dealing generally with business or trade practices and thus, incidentally 
with consumer credit.69 These provincial statutes conferred powers almost 
identical to those found in existing federal legislation regulating small 
loans as well as other consumer protection measures such as disclosure in 
lending requirements.70 Most of the provincial legislation dealt not only 
with money lending but also with the sale of goods or services involving 
credit transactions.71 Still in force today, provincial legislation provides 
the majority of the protection given to consumer debtors, the main 
exception being federal legislation limited to federally regulated financial 
institutions.72  
Given the variety of consumer related provincial measures, and in order 
to overcome internal trade barriers and harmonize commercial legislation 
within the country, First Ministers signed in 1994 an Agreement on Internal 
Trade, the denouement of ongoing negotiations since the 1980s.73 In effect 
since 1 July 1995, the national consensus aimed to eliminate barriers to 
68. The Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, RSO 1960, c 410 [ON-UTRA, 1960]; Barfried 
Enterprises, supra note 67 at 579.
69. Susan Kathleen Burns, The Borrowers and Depositors Protection Act: A Case History in 
Legislative Failure (MBA Thesis: UBC, 1981) [unpublished] at 10, 59-60; Senate of Canada, Report 
of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce on the Subject-Matter of Bill 
C-16, Journals of the Senate of Canada, 30-32 (7 July 1977), Appendix (p 775) at 23-24 (Chairman: 
Senator Slater A Hayden). See also Ziegel, “Legal Regulation,” supra note 30.
70. Ziegel, “Consumer Credit Regulation,” supra note 2 at 496; Ziegel, “Recent Developments,” 
supra note 6; Pitch, supra note 26 at 325.
71. Pitch, supra note 26 at 327-328.
72. Ziegel, “Legal Regulation,” supra note 30 at 105. For a recent analysis of federal legislation on 
consumer credit, see generally: Gleixner, “A Canadian Financial Consumer Protection Code,” supra 
note 55.
73. Internal Trade Secretariat, Agreement on Internal Trade, Consolidated Version (2015), online: 
Internal Trade Secretariat <www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Consolidated-with-14th-
Protocol-final-draft.pdf> [https://perma.cc/P3BF-LXVL] [Internal Trade Secretariat, AIT]. 
Consumer Credit in Canada:  A Regulatory Patchwork 711
trade, investment and mobility within Canada by the streamlining and 
harmonization of consumer-related regulations and standards while 
maintaining a high and effective level of consumer protection. The theory 
was that the reconciliation of different federal, provincial and territorial 
consumer protection measures would allow Canadian firms to “capitalize 
on economies of scale by servicing larger markets with the same products” 
and to benefit from fairer competition.74
Along with an Internal Trade Secretariat, a Consumer Measures 
Committee was created pursuant to this agreement to establish a forum for 
“national cooperation to improve the marketplace for Canadian consumers” 
reuniting representatives of the federal and all provincial governments.75 
With all parties agreeing to implement the principles and template 
provisions in their jurisdictions, the Committee has since completed five 
harmonization agreements dealing with collection agencies, cooperative 
enforcement on consumer related measures, cost of credit disclosure, 
direct sellers and internet sales contracts. 
In addition, the Committee also serves as a research and consultative 
body to enhance ongoing legislative reforms in its members’ respective 
jurisdictions. According to the annual reports published by the Internal 
Trade Secretariat, various working groups on consumer issues had been 
created to review measures relating to the alternative consumer credit 
market including payday loans, credit reporting, enforcement best practices 
and consumer awareness.76 Other issues considered by the Committee 
were the regulation of gift cards and reward programs, identity theft, data-
sharing and analysis of consumer complaints as well as unfair terms in 
consumer contracts.
With a new Canadian Free Trade Agreement, in force since 1 July 
2017, and the continued recognition of the importance and necessity 
of enhancing existing consumer protection regulatory measures, there 
appeared to be support for future collaboration towards the harmonization 
of consumer protection legislation.77 Unfortunately, despite early concerted 
efforts with fairly productive results, the Committee on Consumer-Related 
74. Internal Trade Secretariat, Committee of Ministers on Internal Trade Annual Report, The 
Agreement on Internal Trade, April, 1996 to March, 1997, at 8, online: Internal Trade Secretariat 
<https://www.cfta-alec.ca/annual-reports/> [https://perma.cc/R9HD-42CD].
75. Canada, Innovation, Science and Economic Development, “Consumer Measures Committee” 
(last modified 7 March 2019) online: Canada <cmcweb.ca/eic/site/cmc-cmc.nsf/eng/home> [https://
perma.cc/UH63-Z8ED][CMC].
76. Internal Trade Secretariat, Annual reports, online: Internal Trade Secretariat <www.cfta-alec.ca/
annual-reports/> [https://perma.cc/XJL5-MELM]. 
77. Canadian Free Trade Agreement, (1 July 2017), art 400, online: Internal Trade Secretariat 
<www.cfta-alec.ca/canadian-free-trade-agreement/> [https://perma.cc/RGJ5-BUX8].
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Measures and Standards does not seem to be active given the absence 
of any developments on consumer credit related matters in recent annual 
reports, and no consultations in progress according to its website.78
Given the foregoing, provincial legislation is similar in many regards 
but remains fragmented from province to province and divided into various 
consumer protection measures, always vulnerable to inconsistencies 
as a result of unique provincial political ideologies and objectives. As 
will be revealed in Part III, the federal government’s abdication of its 
responsibilities with respect to the protection of financial consumers has 
meant that the financial services framework is vulnerable to “confusion 
and inconsistencies in rate setting and administration of the newly adopted 
provincial legislation.”79 Notwithstanding these ongoing challenges of 
governing a modern financial industry within a federalist framework, it is 
important to note the scope and extent of provincial legislation. 
Although provincial statutes clearly apply to provincially incorporated 
entities such as credit unions, mutual funds and securities dealers, as well 
as insurance and trust and loan companies,80 the issue remained whether 
provincial consumer protection legislation also applied to federally 
regulated financial institutions. This issue was conclusively resolved by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Bank of Montreal v Marcotte81 where the 
Court considered whether conversion charges imposed by several federal 
banking institutions on credit card purchases made in foreign currencies 
violated Québec’s Consumer Protection Act.82 The Court rejected the 
financial institutions’ arguments that the provincial statute did not apply 
to them based on interjurisdictional immunity and federal paramountcy of 
federal legislation enacted pursuant to the federal head of power relating 
to banks.83 Rather, the Court concluded that the provincial disclosure 
provision did not impair the core of the federal banking power and 
confirmed the applicability of provincial legislation to federally regulated 
financial institutions: 
78. CMC, supra note 75.
79. Ziegel, “Consumer Insolvencies,” supra note 34 at 388; Waldron, “The Federal Interest Act,” 
supra note 7 at 161. See also Gleixner, “A Canadian Financial Consumer Protection Code,” supra note 
55 at 57.
80. Canada, Department of Finance, Reforming Canada’s Financial Services Sector: A Framework 
for the Future (25 June 1999) at 66, online (pdf): Canada <publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/
F2-136-1999E.pdf> [https://perma.cc/D4P4-YWAY] [Canada, Reforming Canada’s Financial 
Services Sector (1999)].
81. Bank of Montreal v Marcotte, 2014 SCC 55 [Marcotte].
82. Consumer Protection Act, CQLR c P-40.1 [QC-CPA].
83. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 20, s 91(15) (“Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue 
of Paper Money.”)
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Banks cannot avoid the application of all provincial statutes that in 
any way touch on their operations, including lending and currency 
conversion. Provincial regulation of mortgages, securities and contracts 
can all be said to relate to lending in some general sense, and will at 
times have a significant impact on banks’ operations.84 
[…]
Just as the basic rules of contract cannot be said to frustrate the federal 
purpose of comprehensive and exclusive standards, if indeed such purpose 
exists, so too do general rules regarding disclosure and accompanying 
remedies support rather than frustrate the federal scheme.85
The importance of provincial legislation regulating consumer credit cannot 
be overstated considering the vast array of consumer protection measures 
found in provincial legislation applicable to federally and provincially 
incorporated creditors. Moreover, the alternative financial services 
market is almost entirely regulated by provincial regulation which aims 
to protect vulnerable financial consumers who are marginalized by federal 
financial institutions and often dependent upon fringe financial services. 
Regulating the various types of consumer credit as well as the various 
actors in the consumer credit industry, provincial legislation is thus 
becoming increasingly important from a consumer protection perspective 
and deserves greater scrutiny.
III. Provincial consumer protection legislation
Part III therefore proposes to analyze the historical evolution of provincial 
consumer credit regulation and in particular consumer protection measures 
related to pawnbroking, unconscionable transactions relief, cost of credit 
disclosure, fair trade practices, payday loans and other high-cost credit 
products. Where relevant, issues relating to disclosure requirements, 
licensing requirements, limits on the terms of agreements and enforcement 
mechanisms will be addressed throughout each subsection. 
1. Pawnbroking legislation
Pawnbroking is one of the oldest social and legal institutions, dating as far 
back as the Middle Ages, and in Canada to its first colonies. As explained by 
Jacob Ziegel, “[t]he pledging of chattels as collateral, commonly known as 
pawnbroking when conducted by a lender operating from fixed premises 
open to the public, is the oldest security device known to most legal 
systems.”86 The essence of pawnbroking is that the pawnbroker retains 
84. Marcotte, supra note 81 at para 68.
85. Ibid at para 79.
86. Ziegel, “Consumer Insolvencies,” supra note 34 at 356.
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personal property the debtor has pledged as security for the repayment 
of a small loan. Representing an expensive form of short-term consumer 
credit, pawnbroking remains an alternative option for many low-income 
or financially distressed borrowers.87 The historical and current appeal of 
this type of credit for consumers is explained by the simplicity and rapidity 
of the transaction and the absence of the requirement to meet a credit test 
since the loans are based on secured collateral. 
Iain Ramsay’s research revealed in 2001 that a lender’s loan was 
typically between “5-10 percent of the original price of the goods which 
represents about one third to one-half the price which the broker can 
expect to receive for the sale of a good during the worst of times,” and the 
repayment rate of pawnbrokers varied from seventy to eighty per cent.88 If 
the loan is not repaid, the borrower is considered to have forfeited the right 
to redeem the goods pledged as security and the goods could thereafter be 
resold to recover the amount owed by the borrower. 
Although pawnbroking has been the subject of regulation in England 
since the 16th century, it was first regulated by pre-confederate Ontario 
and New Brunswick statutes starting in 1851 and subsequently subsumed 
by the federal government pursuant to its constitutional jurisdiction over 
matters relating to interest.89 Pursuant to the Pawnbrokers Act, monthly 
interest and charges for warehouse storage were limited to five cents for 
every four dollars when the sum advanced exceeded 20 dollars90 which 
represented an annual percentage rate (APR) of 150%. The federal 
statute further protected consumers of pawnshops by recognizing a right 
of redemption as well as imposing criminal sanctions for charging an 
unlawful rate or forging a pawnbroker’s notes.91 Federal legislation was, 
however, repealed in 1983 and replaced in part by the usury provisions of 
the Criminal Code which prescribes a criminal interest rate of sixty per 
cent.92
Notwithstanding what seemed to be a more restrictive interest rate 
cap on their financial services, the industry, which seemed to be in decline 
in the 1970s and 1980s, experienced a rebound and pawnbrokers were 
increasing in number in several provinces by 2000.93 It is, however, to 
87. Iain Ramsay, “The Alternative Consumer Credit Market and Financial Sector: Regulatory Issues 
and Approaches” (2001) 35:3 Can Bus LJ 325 at 349 [Ramsay, “Alternative Consumer Credit”].
88. Ibid at 348.
89. Pawnbrokers Act, RSC 1970, c P-5.
90. Ibid, ss 4-5.
91. Ibid, ss 6-8.
92. Miscellaneous Statute Repeal Act, C 1980–1983, c 159, in force on 1 December 1983; Criminal 
Code, supra note 51, s 347.
93. Ramsay, “Alternative Consumer Credit,” supra note 87 at 348; Claude Masse, “Le prêt sur gage 
Consumer Credit in Canada:  A Regulatory Patchwork 715
be expected with the recent rise in payday loans that many low-income 
borrowers have migrated to this newer and even simpler form of high-cost 
consumer credit, as will be discussed in Part III, section 5.
Since the federal statute did not require that pawnbrokers be federally 
licensed, several provinces including British Columbia, New Brunswick, 
Ontario and Québec also enacted, at the end of the 19th century, 
pawnbrokers legislation similar to the federal statute but with licensing 
requirements.94 These early statutes also provided additional consumer 
protection measures such as a longer redemption period, and prohibited 
several unfair and abusive practices.
The pawnbroking industry also has a long history with municipalities 
and their power to regulate local businesses delegated to them by the 
provinces via local governance or municipal legislative frameworks.95 For 
example, the Act to Incorporate the City of Vancouver of 1886 delegated 
the right to license, regulate and govern pawnbrokers or dealers in second-
hand goods in the city.96 As such, pawnbrokers in many municipalities 
have long been subjected to municipal by-laws and are required to obtain 
a licence and abide by certain conditions, not so much for the protection 
of consumer debtors but to prevent these establishments from becoming 
repositories for stolen property.97
In New Brunswick, the power to license businesses and regulate 
their dealings in personal property was delegated to municipalities in 
1966.98  A City of Moncton by-law now requires pawnbrokers to obtain 
—qu’en est-il et comment est-il contrôlé?” (2000), online: Réseau juridique du Québec <www.avocat.
qc.ca/public/iipretgage.htm> [https://perma.cc/CKY8-VW26].
94. (BC) Pawnbrokers Act, RSBC 1897, c 152; (NB) Pawnbrokers Act, SNB 1877, c 17; RSNB 
1952, c 199 repealed by Municipalities Act, SNB 1966, c 20, s 199 [NB-Municipalities Act]; (ON) 
An Act respecting Pawnbrokers and Pawnbroking, RSO, 1877, c 148; The Pawnbrokers Act, RSO 
1937, c 244; (QC) An Act to Consolidate and Amend the Law respecting Licenses and the duties and 
obligations of persons bound to hold same, SQ 1870, c 2, ss 69-105.
95. Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, Local governments 
and the growth of surveillance (30 August 2006) at 1, online: OIPC <www.oipc.bc.ca/special-
reports/1262> [https://perma.cc/LQN9-V39Z].
96. Act to Incorporate the City of Vancouver, SBC 1886, c 32, s 142(83). See also An Act to amend 
and revise the Acts relating to Municipalities, SM 1884, c 11, s 111(36); An Act relating to Rag and 
Junk Shops in the City of Halifax, SNS 1867, c 85.
97. Department of Justice, Nova Scotia, Pawn Shop, Buy-Sell and Second-Hand Businesses 
Legislation Discussion Paper (May 2006) at 1, online (pdf): Nova Scotia <novascotia.ca/just/
publications/docs/DISCUSSION%20PAPER%20FINAL.pdf> [https://perma.cc/RT44-KJA9]; 
Ziegel, “Consumer Insolvencies,” supra note 34 at 357; Buckland, Hard Choices, supra note 15 at 
48-49.
98. NB-Municipalities Act, supra note 94, ss 112, 199; RSNB 1973, c M-22, ss 165-167.1 repealed 
and replaced by Local Governance Act, SNB 2017, c 18, s 10(1)(h): a local government may make 
by-laws for municipal purposes respecting (h) businesses, business activities and persons engaged in 
business; and (n) the acquisition, sale, management, leasing, renting of or any other dealings in personal 
property, or any interest in personal property. For another example, see Municipal Government Act, 
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a licence and to keep a permanent record of information which includes 
descriptions of personal property held, the date and time of transactions, 
the  debtors’ information including two forms of identification, as well as 
a record of any sales of the personal property.99 In addition, a pawnbroker 
is not permitted to sell any property pledged as security for a loan before 
one month has elapsed from the date the borrower was given to redeem 
the property. Reflecting the earlier provincial statute, property cannot be 
accepted as security for a loan from a person under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs, a person under the age of eighteen years, or a person failing to 
identify themselves or who may be offering stolen or illegally acquired 
property.
Until recently, provincial legislation regulating pawnbrokers was 
found in  British Columbia, Ontario, Québec and Saskatchewan as well 
as the three territories.100 Unlike provinces that rely solely on municipal 
regulation, provincial legislation in these jurisdictions provides for 
restrictions and obligations on lenders throughout the province or territory 
and provides additional financial consumer protection, which is often 
absent in municipal by-laws. For example, provincial legislation prohibits 
certain acts, and regulates the pawner’s right of redemption, the charging 
of fees, the cost of credit disclosure requirements, and the recording of 
pawns and sales. 
It has been suggested that some lenders attempt to avoid restrictive 
pawnbroking regulations by operating as secondhand dealers entering into 
“buy-sell” arrangements with consumers whereby the “pawner sells the 
goods to the broker subject to the right to buy the goods back within a 
period of time.”101 These lenders thereby avoid the requirements prescribed 
in British Columbia, Ontario and Yukon, where the right of redemption of 
the pawner expires only after one year and, in Ontario, only after notice 
is provided by first-class prepaid mail for loans between $15 and $30 and 
a subsequent final notice published in a newspaper for loans more than 
$30.102 
SNS 1998, c 18, s 172(i).
99. City of Moncton, by-law L-302, A By-Law Relating to Pawnbrokers in the City of Moncton 
(2006).
100. (BC) Pawnbrokers Act, RSBC 1996, c 350 [BC-Pawnbrokers Act]; (ON) Pawnbrokers Act, 
RSO 1990, c P.6 [ON-Pawnbrokers Act]; (QC) QC-CPA, supra note 82 (generally applicable to 
pawnbrokers); (SK) Pawned Property (Recording) Act, SS 2003, c P-4.2 [SK-Pawnbrokers Act]; 
(NT) Pawnbrokers and Second-Hand Dealers Act, RSNWT 1988, c P-2 [NT-Pawnbrokers Act]; (NU) 
Pawnbrokers and Second-Hand Dealers Act, RSNWT (Nu) 1988, c P2 [NU-Pawnbrokers Act]; (YK) 
Pawnbrokers and Second-Hand Dealers Act, RSY 2002, c 167 [YK-Pawnbrokers Act].  
101. Ramsay, “Alternative Consumer Credit,” supra note 87 at 349-351; Buckland, Hard Choices, 
supra note 15 at 149.
102. (ON) ON-Pawnbrokers Act, supra note 100, ss 20-22; (BC) BC-Pawnbrokers Act, supra note 
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In Ontario, the act further provides legal remedies to the debtor should 
a pawnbroker refuse to give the pledge back upon tender of money owing, 
and sets the maximum fees in addition to the interest legally payable on 
the sum lent.103 Finally, provincial licensing requirements are imposed 
in Québec, Nunavut, Yukon and Northwest Territories, as well as in 
Ontario via its municipalities.104 In Québec, pawnbrokers are licensed 
and regulated by the same provisions applicable to other money lenders, 
including consumer protection provisions against exorbitant or usurious 
credit costs.105 Judicial interpretation of these statutory provisions has 
currently capped the non-exorbitant or non-usurious rate between thirty 
and thirty-five per cent in this province.106
Unfortunately, instead of increasing consumer protection and 
modernizing the statutes, the tendency across the country has been the 
repeal of provincial and territorial legislation specifically regulating 
pawnbrokers, beginning with British Columbia in 2002 and the Northwest 
Territories in 2013.107 Opposed by the Association of Municipalities 
of Ontario and the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police, albeit for 
enforcement and security concerns rather than consumer protection, 
Ontario has recently enacted legislation repealing its Pawnbrokers Act but 
it is not yet in force.108 
100, s 12; (YK) YK-Pawnbrokers Act, supra note 100, s 6.
103. ON-Pawnbrokers Act, supra note 100, ss 25, 28.
104. (ON) Ibid, s 2; (QC) QC-CPA, supra note 82, s 321; (NT) NT-Pawnbrokers Act, supra note 100, 
s 2; (NU) NU-Pawnbrokers Act, supra note 100, s 2; (YK) YK-Pawnbrokers Act, supra note 100, s 2.
105. Art 1437, CCQ; QC-CPA, supra note 82, s 8 (originally Art 1040c CCLC).
106. Capital Corporation c Ferme Maraypier inc, 2014 QCCS 4587 at para 43; Riendeau c 
Compagnie de la Baie d’Hudson, [2004] JQ no 11070 at para 465, aff’d 2006 QCCA 1379 (28.8% 
did not contravene provincial legislation); Riopel c Gagnon, 2009 QCCQ 2315 at para 102; Ferlac 
Inc c Lemay, 2008 QCCQ 12221; Bégin c Marcouiller, 2007 QCCQ 7742 at para 11;  Saviolakis c 
Immeubles Marai inc, [2000] JQ no 6962 at para 82, aff’d [2002] JQ no 8381 (CA): “L’emploi des 
termes “excessif” et “exorbitant” implique que le coût du prêt dépasse la mesure, excède d’une manière 
exagérée la normalité ou que l’opération équivaut à un abus qui choque l’ordre public, assimilable à 
un prêt à un taux usuraire.” Initially, the Québec Court of Appeal had held in St-Jacques c Mantha, 
[1999] JQ no 1335 at para 57 that 25% was “exorbitant and usurious.” See also Stephanie Ben-Ishai, 
“Regulating Payday Lenders in Canada: Drawing on American Lessons” (2008) 23:3 BFLR 323 at 
326 [Ben-Ishai, “Regulating Payday Lenders”]; John C Kleefeld, “Homo legislativus: Missing Link in 
the Evolution of ‘Behaviour Modification?’” (2011) 53 SCLR (2d) 169 at para 52.
107. (BC) Deregulation Statutes Amendment Act, 2002, SBC 2002, c 12, s 30 (the Act applied only 
to loans under $50); (NT) An Act to Repeal the Pawnbrokers and Second-Hand Dealers Act, SNWT 
2013, c 24.
108. Restoring Ontario’s Competitiveness Act, 2019, SO 2019, c 4, Schedule 2, s 1 (not in force); 
Association of Municipalities of Ontario, “Bill 66—Restoring Ontario’s Competitiveness Act, 
Submission to the Standing Committee on General Government” (18 March 2019), online: AMO 
<www.amo.on.ca/AMO-PDFs/Reports/2019/AMO-Submission-Bill-66-Restoring-Ontario-s-
Competi.aspx> [https://perma.cc/H8WR-WX7A]; Travis Dhanraj, “Police association says repealing 
and not replacing Pawnbrokers Act sends ‘wrong message’ to thieves,” Global News (24 January 
2019) online: <globalnews.ca/news/4883939/pawnbrokers-act-bill-66-ontario/> [perma.cc/78SS-
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Despite these legislative setbacks, not all is lost for consumers. As 
further discussed in Part III, sections 5 and 6, the emergence of new high-
cost credit products has put pressure on policymakers in some provinces 
to enact new financial consumer protection statutes dealing with these 
financial services. Legislation in Alberta and Québec now regulates high-
cost credit products and applies to all lenders including pawnbrokers.
Like other parallel or fringe financial services, the regulatory 
framework relating to pawnbroking is manifestly inadequate in Canada 
and the absence of a national strategy to regulate pawnshops in Canada 
is a concern, as “[t]he inequality in their bargaining positions exposes 
borrowers to the potential for unfair practices by pawnshops.”109 This 
is especially worrisome since existing provisions, whether municipal, 
provincial or federal, do not seem to be consistently and actively enforced 
in many cases.110 According to one study in Québec, most pawnbrokers 
in Montreal violated the criminal interest rate provision, the disclosure 
requirements in the federal Interest Act and the provincial disclosure and 
licensing requirements of the Consumer Protection Act.111 Factoring in all 
storage and administrative fees as required by the Criminal Code, annual 
interest fees charged by pawnbrokers were between 300% and 500% and 
one pledge agreement charged as high as 1,000%. Similarly, case law in 
Saskatchewan revealed an effective annual rate of interest charged by a 
pawnbroker between 472.5% and 541.9%.112
In summary, since the repeal of the federal statute in 1983, few 
provinces have enacted legislation to protect consumers who use the 
services of pawnbrokers, and existing regulation whether local or 
provincial, when adopted or enacted, does not seem to be enforced. As a 
result, it is an industry that remains largely unregulated and three levels 
of governments continue to fail to protect financial consumers against the 
abusive practices of some, if not most, pawnbrokers.
VBE8].
109. Ziegel, “Consumer Insolvencies,” supra note 34 at 357.
110. Some pawnbrokers in the Moncton area want the provincial governments to start regulating 
the industry or at least for municipalities to better enforce current regulations. See Paul Cormier, 
“Moncton pawn shops seek better regulations of their industry,” Global News (18 July 2016) online: 
<globalnews.ca/news/2832373/moncton-pawn-shops-seek-better-regulations-of-their-industry/> 
[perma.cc/JDV9-REUX]; Ramsay, “Alternative Consumer Credit,” supra note 87 at 385; Ann 
Cavoukian, Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Order MO-2225 (11 July 2007) at 
2, online: <https://decisions.ipc.on.ca/ipc-cipvp/orders/en/item/212499/index.do?q=2225> [https://
perma.cc/8AXK-TEX4]. 
111. Masse, supra note 93.
112. See also R v Duzan (1992), 99 Sask R 171, [1992] SJ No 32 (QB) aff’d (1993), 105 Sask R 295, 
79 CCC (3d) 552 (CA).
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2. Unconscionable transactions relief legislation
Originally exercised by the courts of equity, the doctrine of equitable relief 
or unconscionability has a long judicial history protecting vulnerable 
parties and setting aside contracts on the basis of unfairness, lack of 
consent, avoidance of unjust enrichment, undue influence or inequality of 
bargaining power.113 In Canada, the common law test of unconscionability 
and the principles considered objectively by the Court governing the 
doctrine have been applied inconsistently. Existing appellate case law 
in Ontario and Alberta appears to require four elements to establish 
unconscionability: 
1. a grossly unfair and improvident transaction;
2. a victim’s lack of independent legal advice or other suitable advice;
3. an overwhelming imbalance in bargaining power caused by the 
victim’s ignorance of business, illiteracy, ignorance of the language of 
the bargain, blindness, deafness, illness, senility, or similar disability; 
and
4. the other party’s knowingly taking advantage of this vulnerability.114
By comparison, the Ontario Court of Appeal has recently suggested that a 
majority of judges of the Supreme Court of Canada in Douez applied the 
113. Stephen Waddams, “Abusive or Unconscionable Clauses from a Common Law Perspective” 
(2010) 49 Can Bus LJ 378 at 378-385 [Waddams, “Unconscionable Clauses”]; Stephen M Waddams, 
The Law of Contracts, 7th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2017) at 444-561 [Waddams, The Law of 
Contracts].
114. Titus v William F Cooke Enterprises Inc, 2007 ONCA 573 at para 38 [Titus] recently affirmed 
in Phoenix Interactive Design Inc v Alterinvest II Fund LP, 2018 ONCA 98 at paras 38-39; Cain v 
Clarica Life Insurance Co, 2005 ABCA 437 at para 32; Lydian Properties Inc v Chambers, 2009 
ABCA 21 at paras 13-14. In contrast, while the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal applied 
six principles in Picher v Downer, 2017 NLCA 13, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Dolter v 
Media House Productions Inc, 2002 SKCA 140 at para 4 (CA) adopted the following three-prong test: 
1. Significant inequality in bargaining position exists between the parties based on fac-
tors such as the relative knowledge and education of the parties, the financial needs of 
the weaker party, or other circumstances that coerced the weaker party;
2. The stronger party has used its position of power in an unconscionable manner to 
achieve a material advantage over the weaker party. If it has not, then the bargain 
should not be interfered with even though it may be viewed as improvident, provided 
that it does not otherwise offend the third threshold factor hereinafter stated.
3. The bargain arrived at has given the one party a grossly unfair advantage over the 
other, or otherwise is sufficiently divergent from community standards of commercial 
morality to warrant it being set aside. Thus, if the bargain is fair the fact [that] one of 
the parties was at a material disadvantage because of ignorance, need or other distress 
is of no moment
See also Rick Bigwood, “Rescuing the Canadian Unconscionability Doctrine? Reflections on the 
Court’s ‘Applicable Principles’ in Downer v. Pitcher” (2018), 60 Can Bus LJ 124; JA Manwaring, 
“Unconscionability: Contested Values, Competing Theories and Choice of Rule in Contract Law” 
(1993) 25:2 Ottawa L Rev 235.
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two-prong test first advanced by the British-Columbia Court of Appeal in 
Morrison and considered in obiter by Justice LaForest in Norberg:
[A] plea that a bargain is unconscionable invokes relief against an unfair 
advantage gained by an unconscientious use of power by a stronger party 
against a weaker. On such a claim the material ingredients are proof of 
inequality in the position of the parties arising out of the ignorance, need 
or distress of the weaker, which left him in the power of the stronger, and 
proof of substantial unfairness of the bargain obtained by the stronger. 
On proof of those circumstances, it creates a presumption of fraud which 
the stronger must repel by proving that the bargain was fair, just and 
reasonable.115
In addition, legislative unconscionability was enacted to remedy specific 
contractual grievances. Following the abolition of usury legislation 
in England, borrowers who remained vulnerable under the common 
law doctrine were further protected from oppressive loans by early 
money lending legislation starting with The Money-lenders Act, 1900.116 
Protection was confined to cases involving some circumstance of 
harshness or unconscionability other than the excessive cost of the loan. 
Notably absent in Canada’s money lending legislation, these consumer 
protection measures were nevertheless adopted by Newfoundland in 1907 
and Ontario in 1912 in their provincial statutes regulating money lenders, 
as previously mentioned.117  
Similar unconscionable transactions relief legislation was not adopted 
nationwide by the other provinces since its validity was uncertain given 
the federal constitutional jurisdiction over matters relating to interest.118 
However, within five years of the 1963 Supreme Court of Canada’s 
115. Douez v Facebook, Inc, 2017 SCC 33 at paras 115 (Abella, J concurring), 145 (McLachlin, 
Moldaver and Côté JJ dissenting) [Douez]; Heller v Uber Technologies Inc, 2019 ONCA 1 at 60-61; 
Morrison v Coast Finance Ltd (1965), 55 DLR (2d) 710 at 713, 54 WWR 257 (BCCA) [emphasis 
added] [Morrison] subsequently approved in Norberg v Wynrib, [1992] 2 SCR 226 at 248, 256, 92 
DLR (4th) 449 [Norberg]. See also Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Ohlson, [1997] AJ No 
1185 at paras 20-24, 1997 ABCA 413 and Harrity v Kennedy, 2009 NBCA 60 at para 30 both citing 
with approval Morrison and Harry v Kreutziger (1978), 9 BCLR 166, 95 DLR (3rd) 231 (CA). See 
also JohnPaul F Bogden, “On the ‘Agreement Most Foul’: A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of 
Unconscionability” (1997), 25 Man LJ 187; Waddams, The Law of Contracts, supra note 113 at 552; 
Angela Swan, Jakub Adamski & Annie Y Na, Canadian Contract Law, 4th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 
2018) at 986-989.
116. The Money-lenders Act 1900 (UK), 63 & 64 Vict, c 51, s 1; An Act to repeal the laws relating 
to usury and to the enrolment of annuities (UK), 1854, 17 & 18 Vict, c 90; Patrick Hastings, The Law 
Relating to Money-Lenders and Unconscionable Bargains (London: Butterworth, 1905) at 11-12, 15.
117. The Ontario Money Lenders Act, SO 1912, c 30, ss 5-8; RSO 1914, c 175, ss 4-7; RSO 1937, 
c 243, title amended to The Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act and money lending provisions 
repealed by An Act to amend the Money-Lenders Act, SO 1946, c 58, s 1. See also Cuming, supra note 
1 at 69.
118. Cuming, supra note 1 at 69, n 72. 
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Barfried Enterprises decision119 confirming the constitutional validity of 
the Ontario statute, most provinces had enacted similar legislation offering 
broad relief from unconscionable loan transactions to better protect 
financial consumers from unscrupulous lenders in the emerging consumer 
credit market.120 
According to Ronald Cuming, “[t]hese acts give wide powers to 
the courts to police against usury and harsh and unconscionable results 
which otherwise would result from the enforcement of consumer credit 
contracts.”121 Judicial consideration of these statutes has confirmed that 
their purpose was to “provide a remedy for unfair loans”122 and “to relieve 
a party to a contract from his obligations where the contract was made 
absent his informed consent or in circumstances of unequal bargaining 
power.”123 As confirmed by Joseph Roach, “every province has now 
enacted legislation to prevent and redress unconscionable transactions by 
giving full powers to the courts to either cancel or modify such mortgage 
[or other credit] agreement where it is adjudicated that the costs of the loan 
are excessive, abusive or unconscionable.”124 
119. Barfried Enterprises, supra note 67 at 577.
120. (AB) The Unconscionable Transactions Act, SA 1964, c 99; (BC) Consumer Protection Act, SBC 
1967, c 14, ss 17-20 [BC-CPA 1967]; (MB) The Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, SM 1964 (2d 
Sess), c 13, as amended by SM 1965, c 87; (NB) Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, SNB 1964, 
c 14; (NL) Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, 1962, SN 1962, No 38; (NS) Unconscionable 
Transactions Relief Act, SNS 1964, c 12, as amended by SNS 1966, c 83; (ON) ONUTRA, 1960, supra 
note 68; (PEI) The Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, SPEI 1964, c 35; Business Practices Act, 
SPEI 1977, c 31; (QC) Art 1040c CCLC (added by SQ 1964, c 67, s 1); (SK) The Unconscionable 
Transactions Relief Act, 1967, SS 1967, c 86.
121. Cuming, supra note 1 at 69.
122. Briones v National Money Mart Co, 2014 MBCA 57 at para 23. See also Trans Canada Credit 
Corp v Ramsay (1980), 27 Nfld & PEIR 144, 74 APR 144 (PEISC) at 154: “This legislation was 
obviously passed for the protection of persons urgently in need of money but not skilled in the practice 
of borrowing it and who are thereby more or less defenceless in the hands of lenders, professional or 
otherwise, who seek to take advantage of them…The intent and purpose of the legislation is to give 
relief only…where it is obvious that an unfair advantage has been taken of the borrower.”
123. Milani v Banks (1997), 32 OR (3d) 557 at 563, 145 DLR (4th) 55 (CA) [Milani] citing with 
approval Barfried Enterprises, supra note 67 at 577, (Justice Judson): “the theory of the legislation is 
that the Court is enabled to relieve a debtor, at least in part, of the obligations of a contract to which 
in all the circumstances of the case he cannot be said to have given a free and valid consent.” See also 
Ekstein v Jones (2005), 34 RPR (4th) 280, [2005] OJ No 3497 (SCJ) [Ekstein]; Grand Ridge Estates 
Ltd v Breadner Holdings Inc, 2018 ONSC 655 [Grand Ridge Estates].
124. Joseph E Roach, The Canadian Law of Mortgages, 3rd ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2018) at 
605-606. See recent statutes: (AB) Unconscionable Transactions Act, RSA 2000, c U-2 [AB-UTA]; 
(BC) Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, SBC 2004, c 2, ss 7-10 [BC-BPCPA]; (MB) 
The Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, RSM 1987, c U20 [MB-UTRA]; (NB) Unconscionable 
Transactions Relief Act, RSNB 2011, c 233 [NB-UTRA]; (NL) Consumer Protection and Business 
Practices Act, SNL 2009, c C-31.1, ss 8-17 replacing Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, 
RSNL 1990, c U-1 [NL-CPBPA]; (NS) Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, RSNS 1989, c 
481 [NS-UTRA]; Money-lenders Act, RSNS 1989, c 289 [NS Money-lenders Act]; (Nu) Consumer 
Protection Act, RSNWT (Nu) 1988, c C-17, ss 50.1–50.6 added by SNu 2017, c 18, s 2 [NU-CPA]; 
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In Alberta, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Nunavut, Ontario and Prince 
Edward Island, when the cost of a loan is excessive and the transaction is 
harsh and unconscionable, courts may be called upon to review the contract 
between the parties. When doing so, the risk and all the circumstances 
of the money lending transaction must be considered, including any 
charge given to secure repayment.125 As a result, both components must 
be established. Ronald Cuming further explains: “if the credit charge is 
reasonable but the other terms of the transaction, such as the provision 
with respect to repayment or the rights of the lender in the event of default 
by the borrower, are harsh and unconscionable, the court will not have 
power to give the necessary relief.”126 
In comparison, the statutory provision in Manitoba and Saskatchewan 
is disjunctive. Relief is available when the cost of a loan is excessive 
or the transaction is harsh or unconscionable.127 Accordingly, relief 
is still possible if the cost of the loan is excessive but not harsh or 
unconscionable. Nevertheless, in most cases, excessive interest and costs 
are usually sufficient in and of themselves to render a contract harsh and 
unconscionable unless refuted by the lender.128 When judicially considered, 
“[b]oth components are cast against the risk and circumstances at the time 
the contract is entered.”129 In addition to a comparison with the rates in the 
prevailing market in the area for the same general type of loan involving a 
similar risk, the excessiveness of the cost of the loan is also determined by 
the risk associated with the loan, including an examination of the following 
non-exclusive risk factors for the lender: 
(a) where the borrower is unknown to the lender;
(b) where the borrower solicited the loan;
(c) where the loan is for a short period of time;
(d) where there is urgency on the part of the borrower to obtain funds;
(e) where the lender has to borrow funds in order to finance the loan;
(f ) where the borrower has a history of previous default;
(ON) Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, RSO 1990, c U.2 [ON-UTRA]; (PEI) Unconscionable 
Transactions Relief Act, RSPEI 1988, c U-2 [PEI-UTRA]; (QC) arts 1437, 1623, 2332 CCQ; QC-CPA, 
supra note 82, s 8; (SK) The Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, RSS 1978, c U-1 [SK-UTRA].
125. AB-UTA, supra note 124, s 2; NB-UTRA, supra note 124, s 2; NS-UTRA, supra note 124, s 3; 
NU-CPA, supra note 124, s 50.2; ON-UTRA, supra note 124, s 2; PEI-UTRA, supra note 124, s 3.
126. Cuming, supra note 1 at 70-71.
127. MB-UTRA, supra note 124, s 2; SK-UTRA, supra note 124, s 3.
128. Teresa McCrea Investments Inc v Conley Management Ltd, 2012 SKQB 374 [Teresa McCrea] at 
para 64 citing Samuel v Newbold, [1906] AC 461 at 473.
129. Quick Auto Lease Inc v Hogue, 2018 MBQB 126 at paras 28-31.
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(g) the existence of any liens or judgments against the property used to 
secure the loan;
(h) the security offered for the amount borrowed.130
The second component which requires proof that the transaction was harsh 
or unconscionable has been described as follows by the Manitoba Court 
of Appeal: 
[T]he debtor must demonstrate both the inequality of the parties and the 
improvidence of the bargain, before the creditor is obligated to show that 
a contract freely entered into by the parties was fair, just and reasonable 
in the circumstances. Only then, if the creditor fails to do so, can the 
court set aside a valid contract in whole or in part under the Act.131
In order to overcome the significant legal obstacles encountered in earlier 
federal money lending legislation previously discussed, the “cost of the 
loan” is broadly defined in these provincial statutes to include all types of 
charges and fees in addition to interest costs. For example, according to 
the New Brunswick statute, the “cost of the loan” has been largely defined 
as the “whole cost to the debtor of money lent and includes interest, 
discount, subscription, premium, dues, bonus, commission, brokerage fees 
and charges, but not actual lawful and necessary disbursements.”132
Despite a provision or agreement to the contrary, unconscionable 
transactions relief legislation grants broad powers to superior courts to 
provide remedies in any action or proceeding in which the debt is in 
question, commenced either by the debtor, by a creditor for the recovery 
of money lent, or by a third party. In Québec, the Consumer Protection Act 
provides the following relief to financial consumers:
The consumer may demand the nullity of a contract or a reduction in his 
obligations thereunder where the disproportion between the respective 
obligations of the parties is so great as to amount to exploitation of the 
consumer or where the obligation of the consumer is excessive, harsh or 
unconscionable.133
130. Primewest Mortgage Investment Corp v Antonenko, 2018 SKQB 259 at para 54 summarizing 
the first seven risk factors citing Teresa McCrea, supra note 128; Dassen Gold Resources Ltd v Royal 
Bank, [1995] 1 WWR 171, 23 Alta LR (3d) 261 (QB) [Dassen Gold]; Milani, supra note 123; Ekstein, 
supra note 123. The eighth risk factor is found in Teresa McCrea, supra note 128 at paras 41, 65 citing 
Dassen Gold, supra note 130 at para 141.
131. Quick Auto Lease Inc v Nordin, 2014 MBCA 32 at paras 13-14, citing with approval Milani, 
supra note 123 at 564. See also Mintage Financial Corp v Shah, 2005 ABCA 86 at para 86 [Mintage 
Financial Corp], leave to appeal to dismissed, [2005] SCCA No 192 (QL).
132. NB-UTRA, supra note 124, s 1.
133. QC-CPA, supra note 82, s 8. See also Union des consommateurs, Ending Abusive Clauses 
in Consumer Contracts: Final Report of the Project (Montréal: Union des consommateurs, 
2011), online (pdf): Union des consommateurs <uniondesconsommateurs.ca/docu/protec_conso/
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Likewise, a court, in common law jurisdictions, may in respect of a money 
transaction 
(a) reopen the transaction and take an account between the creditor and 
the debtor;
(b) despite a statement or settlement of account or an agreement 
purporting to close previous dealings and create a new obligation, 
reopen an account already taken and relieve the debtor from payment 
of a sum in excess of the sum adjudged by the court to be fairly due 
in respect of the principal and the cost of the loan;
(c) order the creditor to repay the excess if it has been paid or allowed 
on account by the debtor;
(d) set aside, either wholly or in part, or revise or alter a security given 
or agreement made in respect of the money lent, and, if the creditor 
has parted with the security, order the creditor to indemnify the 
debtor.134
A notable exception to this broad power is found in Nova Scotia. In 
addition to a similar Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, the Nova 
Scotia Money-lenders Act grants the court the above powers only when 
the amount of interest exceeds the “legal and valid rate in respect of the 
loan and is not in contravention of any Act heretofore or hereafter enacted 
by the Parliament of Canada,” which currently stands at nineteen per cent 
for payday loans in Nova Scotia and sixty per cent for all other loans.135 
Unfortunately, the consumer seeking reparation is placed at an unfair 
disadvantage. In addition to financing the litigation process, the onus 
remains on the debtor to prove the components of the unconscionable 
transactions.136 To overcome this obstacle, several provinces have 
reformed their statues to consolidate unconscionable transactions with 
unfair practices legislation discussed in Part III, section 4. Accordingly, 
British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador and Nunavut statutes not 
only clarify the circumstances a court must consider, which the supplier 
knew or ought to have known, but transfers the burden of proof to the 
EndAbusiveClauses.pdf> [https://perma.cc/B2AU-H67Z]; Sébastien Grammond, “The Regulation of 
Abusive or Unconscionable Clauses from a Comparative Law Perspective” (2010) 49:3 Can Bus LJ 
345.
134. NB-UTRA, supra note 124, s 2. See also AB-UTA, supra note 124, s 2; MB-UTRA, supra note 
124, s 2; NS-UTRA, supra note 124, s 3; ON-UTRA, supra note 124, s 2; PEI-UTRA, supra note 124, 
s 3; SK-UTRA, supra note 124, s 3.
135. NS Money-lenders Act, supra note 124, s 4; Consumer Protection Act, RSNS 1989, c 92, ss 
18A–18U [NS-CPA]; Re Consumer Protection Act, 2018 NSUARB 215 [NSUARB]; Criminal Code, 
supra note 51, s 347. 
136. McHugh v Forbes (1991), 4 OR (3d) 374 at 377, 1991 CanLII 7199 (CA).
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supplier.137 For example, in British Columbia, surrounding circumstances 
which must be judicially considered include:
• whether the consumer was subjected to undue pressure to enter 
into the transaction; 
• whether the supplier took advantage of the consumer’s inability or 
incapacity to reasonably protect his or her own interest;
• whether the total price grossly exceeded the total price in similar 
ordinary transactions; 
• whether there was no reasonable probability of full payment of the 
total price by the consumer at the time the consumer transaction 
was entered into; and 
• whether the terms or conditions were so harsh or adverse to the 
consumer as to be inequitable.
More importantly, the British Columbia and Newfoundland and Labrador 
statutes provide stronger remedies for financial consumers for an 
unconscionable act or practice by a financial services supplier. With the 
exception of a mortgage loan to which judicial powers resemble the powers 
found in the other provinces as described above, the British Columbia 
statute provides that “if an unconscionable act or practice occurred in 
respect of a consumer transaction, that consumer transaction is not binding 
on the consumer or guarantor.”138 Moreover, the Newfoundland and 
Labrador statute grants the Court the discretion to make a declaratory or 
injunctive order, award damages including exemplary or punitive damages, 
to make an order rescinding or reopening the transaction, or to make any 
other order the Court deems appropriate.139 One wonders whether these 
new legal remedies, should they be judicially enforced, will deter abusive 
and unconscionable practices by consumer lenders. 
Although this type of provincial legislation has been enacted 
throughout the country for more than fifty years and should be part of 
a debtor’s arsenal against creditor abuse, the fact that it has not been 
used extensively to curb predatory or criminal lending may be indicative 
of its ineffectiveness to protect consumers. Mary Anne Waldron has 
previously commented that “although many provinces adopted general 
unconscionable transaction legislation, litigation under those provisions 
does not appear to have been frequent, leading one to question whether 
expecting a consumer to launch a court action in a small loan situation was 
137. BC-BPCPA, supra note 124, s 8; NL-CPBPA, supra note 124, s 8; NU-CPA, supra note 124, s 
72.4(2).
138. BC-BPCPA, supra note 124, s 10.
139. NL-CPBPA, supra note 124, s 10.
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realistic.”140 Recourse to litigation along with the delays and the expense 
involved most likely represent significant obstacles to a debtor, already 
burdened by previous indebtedness, who might seek relief in the Courts 
against the lender. 
Another factor may be the uncertainty created by the perceived 
reluctance of the courts to review the substance of contracts and to set 
aside such transactions in “the absence of evidence of some form of defect 
of consent.”141 For example, Justice LeBel in Miglin v Miglin explained, in 
his dissenting opinion, the necessity of judicial restraint as follows: 
The stringency of the test for unconscionability reflects the strong 
presumption that individuals act rationally, autonomously and in their 
own best interests when they form private agreements. Non-enforcement 
of the parties’ bargain is only justified where the transaction is so distorted 
by unequal bargaining power that this presumption is displaced.142
To address these constraints, Union des Consommateurs recommended, 
following a thorough review of abusive clauses in consumer contracts, 
that consumer organizations and associations should be allowed to seek 
collective legal redress before the courts on behalf of consumers as is 
currently permitted in British Columbia and Manitoba.143 Likewise, some 
provinces have delegated the authority to bring an action against a person 
who has contravened the Act to the Director and request any redress for 
any damage or loss suffered by the debtor. As Iain Ramsay observed in 
2001, however, “[e]ven where such provisions may be enforced by public 
agencies, in Canada these agencies have shown little enthusiasm for testing 
the boundaries of unconscionability legislation.”144 A review of Canadian 
case law reveals that nothing much has changed.
140. Waldron, “A Brief History,” supra note 32 at 304; Ziegel, “Consumer Credit Regulation,” supra 
note 2 at 514-515. See also Ramsay, “Alternative Consumer Credit,” supra note 87 at 378; Halsbury’s 
Laws of Canada (online), Contracts, “Excuses for Contractual Obligations: Techniques of Control: 
Unconscionability and the Protection of Vulnerable Parties: Specific Methods: Unconscionability in 
Transactions” (IX.2(3)(b)(i)) at HCO-144 “Legislation” (2017 Reissue). See also Cuming, supra note 
1 at 71.
141. Grammond, supra note 133 at 377. 
142. Miglin v Miglin, 2003 SCC 24 at para 208. See also Grammond, supra note 133 at 353; Grand 
Ridge Estates, supra note 123; Mintage Financial Corp, supra note 131 at para 86; Waddams, 
“Unconscionable Clauses,” supra note 113 at 392; Titus, supra note 114 at para 36: “A party relying 
on the doctrine of unconscionability to set aside a transaction faces a high hurdle. A transaction may, 
in the eyes of one party, turn out to be foolhardy, burdensome, undesirable or improvident; however, 
this is not enough to cast the mantle of unconscionability over the shoulders of the other party.” 
143. Union des consommateurs, supra note 133 at 28-31, 102. BC-BPCPA, supra note 124, s 172; 
(MB) The Consumer Protection Act, RSM 1987, c C200, s 136.1 [MB-CPA].
144. (AB) Consumer Protection Act, RSA 2000, c C-26.3, s 159 [AB-CPA]; BC-BPCPA, supra note 
124, s 171; Ramsay, “Alternative Consumer Credit,” supra note 87 at 378.
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Given the foregoing, a recommended solution would be that “[i]n the 
interests of certainty and predictability, the intervention should preferably 
come from the legislature (Parliament and the provincial legislatures, in 
Canada’s case), and not be left to the courts to fashion ex post in the guise 
of an unconscionability doctrine.”145
3. Cost of credit disclosure legislation146 
In addition to unconscionable transaction relief provisions, protection of 
financial consumers from oppressive creditors was further strengthened 
by cost of credit disclosure legislation enabling consumers to make better 
financial decisions. As explained by Robert R. Kerton in his study on 
consumers in the financial services sector, “[t]he proliferation of complex 
new differentiated financial services, combined with the transformation of 
traditional sellers, has led to enough noise in the marketplace to confuse 
all but the most sophisticated of consumers.”147
Although minimum disclosure requirements of the annual interest 
rate in credit agreements were first introduced in 1897 when Parliament 
enacted section 2 of the Interest Act, 1897,148 additional disclosure and 
transparency requirements followed in the 1967 reforms of the Bank Act 
in response to the explosion of consumer credit and federal banks entering 
the consumer credit market.149 At that time, many provinces had already 
regulated disclosure provisions for sales transactions and by 1971, most 
provinces had also enacted various consumer protection measures to 
ensure that consumers were informed of the true cost of credit in lending 
transactions.150
145. Ziegel, “Consumer Insolvencies,” supra note 34 at 377.
146. See generally: Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (online), Commercial Law II (Consumer Protection), 
“Financing Protection” (II) at HCP-29-31, HCP-33-34 (2020 Reissue).
147. Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Financial Services Sector, “Principles: Transparency 
and Redress—Essential Components of Consumer Protection Policy” by Robert R Kerton in Robert 
R Kerton, ed, Consumers in the Financial Services Sector, vol 1: Principles, Practice and Policy—the 
Canadian Experience, Catalogue No F21-6/1998-8-1E-PDF (Ottawa: Task Force of the Future of the 
Canadian Financial Services Sector, September 1998) at 30.
148. The Interest Act, 1897, SC 1897, c 8, s 2: when the annual rate of interest was not disclosed in 
the contract, interest was capped at six per cent.
149. Bank Act, SC 1966–1967, c 87, s 92; Bank of Cost of Borrowing Disclosure Regulations, SOR/ 
67-504; Pitch, supra note 26 at 327. See also Consumer Protection Act 1968, 15 USC § 1601 (1968) 
[Truth in Lending Act]; Bill S-2, An Act to Make Provision for the Disclosure of Information in Respect 
of Finance Charges, 5th Sess, 24th Parl, 1962, reintroduced as Bill S-3, 1st Sess, 25th Parl, 1962 
(second reading 6 December 1962). 
150. (AB) The Credit and Loan Agreements Act, SA 1967, c 11; Alta Reg 310/67, Alta Reg 407/67; 
(BC) BC-CPA 1967, supra note 120, Part III, ss 11-16; BC Reg 219/67, BC Reg 251/67, BC Reg 15/68; 
(MB) The Consumer Protection Act, SM 1969, c 4, Part 1, ss 4-27; (NB) The Cost of Credit Disclosure 
Act, SNB 1967, c 6; (NS) Consumer Protection Act, 1966, SNS 1966, c 5, as amended by SNS 1967, 
c 98; NS Reg 8/1966 ; (ON) The Consumer Protection Act, SO 1966, c 23, as amended by SO 1967, 
c 13; O Reg 207/67, O Reg 265/67; (PEI) Consumer Protection Act, 1967, SPEI 1967, c 16; (QC) 
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Resulting from ongoing negotiations during the 1980s and in accordance 
with the Agreement on Internal Trade, provincial governments and the 
federal government agreed, in 1998, upon harmonized legislation on cost 
of credit disclosure provisions. The policy objectives were: 
(a) to ensure that, before making a credit-purchasing decision, 
consumers receive fair, accurate and comparable information about 
the cost of credit;
(b) to ensure that, with respect to non-mortgage credit, consumers are 
entitled to repay their loans at any time and, in that event, to pay 
only those finance charges that have been earned at the time the 
loans are repaid; and
(c) to ensure that the disclosure is as clear and as simple as possible, 
taking into account the inherent complexity of disclosure issues 
related to any form of credit.151
The harmonization template formalized by the Committee on Consumer-
Related Measures and Standards was to guide jurisdictions in implementing 
the agreed upon principles in their respective laws with respect to the cost 
of borrowing disclosure rules.152 At that time, all parties agreed that the 
harmonized cost of credit disclosure legislation must apply to all forms 
of consumer credit, including fixed credit such as loans for a fixed sum 
to be repaid in instalments; open credit such as lines of credit and credit 
cards; loans secured by mortgage of real property; supplier credit such 
as conditional sale agreements; and long-term leases of consumer goods. 
At the federal level, similar cost of credit disclosure provisions found in 
the Bank Act and the federal cost of borrowing regulations were initially 
applicable only to federal banks but are now applicable to all federally 
incorporated financial institutions.153 
Accordingly, all provincial and territorial jurisdictions now impose 
disclosure requirements on credit grantors who extend credit in the 
Consumer Protection Act, SQ 1971, c 74, ss 11, 21, 24, 28, 30; (SK) The Cost of Credit Disclosure 
Act, SS 1967, c 85; Sask Reg 273/67, Sask Reg 316/67, Sask Reg 357/67. But see: Richard H Bowes, 
“Annual Percentage Rate Disclosure in Canadian Cost of Credit Disclosure Laws” (1997) 29 Can Bus 
LJ 183 at 188, n 16: “None of the statutes were ‘pure disclosure’ statutes”; Ziegel, “Consumer Credit 
Regulation,” supra note 2 at 507-508.
151. Consumer Measures Committee, Agreement for Harmonization of Cost of Credit Disclosure 
Laws in Canada: Drafting Template (1 June 1998) at 3, online (pdf): Canada <https://www.ic.gc.
ca/eic/site/cmc-cmc.nsf/vwapj/Cost_of_Credit_Disclosure.pdf/$file/Cost_of_Credit_Disclosure.pdf> 
[https://perma.cc/YX4C-KBKH] [CMC Draft Template]. See also Bowes, supra note 150.
152. Internal Trade Secretariat, AIT, supra note 73 at Annex 807.1, s 7; CMC Draft Template, supra 
note 151. See also Bowes, supra note 150.
153. Bank Act, SC 1991, c 46, ss 449-454; Cost of Borrowing Regulations 2001, supra note 54. See 
also recent amendments An Act to amend the law governing financial institutions and to provide for 
related and consequential matters, SC 2007, c 6, ss 33, 91, 167, 365.
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ordinary course of carrying on their business. The cost of credit may 
include interest, arrangement fees and other charges, as prescribed by 
legislation that varies by jurisdiction. In Alberta, British Columbia, 
Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Québec, Northwest 
Territories, Nunavut and Yukon, the cost of credit disclosure requirements 
are currently governed by provisions of consumer protection legislation, 
while New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador and Saskatchewan 
have separate cost of credit legislation.154
In addition to the method of calculation of the total cost of borrowing, 
legislation in all provinces and territories prescribes, as detailed in 
Appendix A, the various costs and charges to be disclosed as part of a credit 
agreement, and the time and manner in which such disclosure is to take 
place. Along with the specific disclosure requirements prior to entering 
and during the course of the credit agreement by statements of account, 
notice must also be given of any changes relating to the information 
disclosed to the consumer. Despite certain disparities, prescribed disclosure 
requirements for the various types of consumer credit have been largely 
harmonized across the country.
Additional measures apply to credit cards.155 Provincial legislation 
generally focuses on three main consumer protection measures. First, 
unsolicited credit cards are prohibited. However, in some provinces such 
as Ontario and Nova Scotia, even if a consumer has not requested the 
credit card, use of the card will be deemed to constitute written acceptance 
of the credit agreement.156 Likewise, while a card may have been solicited 
without signing an application, the debtor is deemed to have entered into a 
154. (AB) AB-CPA, supra note 144, Part 9. See also s 59(4), (5); Cost of Credit Disclosure Regulation, 
Alta Reg 198/1999 [AB-CCDR]; (BC) BC-BPCPA, supra note 124, Part 5; Disclosure of the Cost 
of Consumer Credit Regulation, BC Reg 273/2004; (MB) MB-CPA, supra note 143, ss 1, 6-35.9; 
Consumer Protection Regulation, Man Reg 227/2006, ss 4.1-19; (NB) Cost of Credit Disclosure 
Act, SNB 2002, c C-28.3 [NB-CCDPLA]; General, NB Reg 2010-104; (NL) NL-CPBPA, supra note 
124, ss 45-71; Cost of Consumer Credit Disclosure Regulations, NLR 74/10; (NS) NS-CPA, supra 
note 135, ss 17-18; Consumer Protection Act Regulations, NS Reg 160/2000 as amended by NS Reg 
72/2018; (NT) Cost of Credit Disclosure Act, SNWT 2011, c 23, ss 6-11; Cost of Credit Disclosure 
Regulations, NWT Reg 014-12; (NU) Consumer Protection Act, RSNWT (Nu) 1988, c C-17, Part 1; 
Consumer Protection Regulations, RRNWT 1990, c C-16, ss 6-8; (ON) Consumer Protection Act, 
2002, SO 2002, c 30, Schedule A, ss 66-81 [ON-CPA]; General Regulation, O Reg 17/05, ss 55-69, 85; 
(PEI) Consumer Protection Act, RSPEI 1988, c-C-19; Cost of Borrowing Disclosure Regulations, PEI 
Reg EC1987-16; (QC) QC-CPA, supra note 82, ss 66-150 and Regulation respecting the application of 
the Consumer Protection Act, CQLR c-P-40.1, r 3, 26–86 [QC-Consumer Protection Regulation]; (SK) 
Cost of Credit Disclosure Act, 2002, SS 2002, c-C-41.01, s 3; Cost of Credit Disclosure Regulations, 
2006, RRS c-C-41.01, Reg 1, s 5; (YT) Consumers Protection Act, RSY 2002, c 40; Regulations 
Respecting the Protection of Consumers, YOIC 1972/400, ss 2-8.
155. See Appendix A for citations to statutory provisions.
156. NS-CPA, supra note 135, s 23; ON-CPA, supra note 154, Schedule A, s 68.
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credit agreement upon first use of the card. Second, provincial legislation 
regulates the card issuer’s disclosure requirements. In most provinces, 
disclosure of prescribed information is required either when the individual 
applies for a credit card or in an initial disclosure statement provided to the 
consumer. Finally, all provinces with credit card legislation provide that a 
card holder is not liable for a debt incurred through the unauthorized use 
of a lost or stolen credit card after the credit card issuer has been given 
notice of the loss or theft. Most provinces limit the maximum total liability 
before the credit card issuer receives notice to $50 or a lesser amount set 
by the credit agreement, except Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island 
who appear to leave the consumer’s liability to the credit card issuer’s 
discretion.157
Although the effectiveness of cost of credit disclosure requirements 
has been questioned and labelled “ineffective and largely a waste 
of money,”158 a recent study has confirmed that for highly educated 
consumers, disclosure regulations and the introduction of plain-language 
contracts have achieved the desired outcome that consumers have a “fairly 
complete understanding” of the credit agreements they enter into and are 
“aware of the risks they are taking.”159 
Despite these positive findings, the Financial Consumer Agency of 
Canada recently confirmed that the results of the research undertaken to 
date reveal that “many consumers lacked the basic financial knowledge 
needed to make sound decisions about their money.”160 Understanding the 
consequences of interest compounding, the necessity for credit life and 
disability insurance, the importance of comparison shopping and looking 
beyond the amount of the finance charge or the instalments are outside the 
157. See e.g. NB-CCDPLA, supra note 154, s 46(2). 
158. Anthony Duggan, “Law, Economics and Public Policy: Essays in Honour of Michael Trebilcock: 
VIII Consumer Law and Policy: Consumer Credit Redux” (2010) 60:2 UTLJ 687 at 699 citing Ronald 
Mann, Charging Ahead: The Growth and Regulation of Payment Card Markets (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). See also Micheline Gleixner, “Financial Literacy, Responsible Lending and 
the Prevention of Personal Insolvency” in Janis P Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2013 
(Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2014) at 598-600 [Gleixner, “Financial Literacy”]; Saul Schwartz, “The 
Canadian Task Force on Financial Literacy: Consulting Without Listening” (2011) 51:3 Can Bus LJ 
338 at 352; Mary Anne Waldron, “Unanswered Questions about Canada’s Financial Literacy Strategy: 
A Comment on the Report of the Federal Task Force Symposium: Financial Literacy for Canadians 
and Reactions to the Federal Task Force Report” (2011) 51:3 Can Bus LJ 361 at 373-374.
159. Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Saul Schwartz & Nancy Werk, “Private Lines of Credit for Law Students 
and Medical Students: A Canadian Perspective” (2017) 32:2 BFLR 343 at 360.
160. Financial Consumer Agency of Canada, “Financial literacy background,” online: FCAC <www.
fcac-acfc.gc.ca> [https://perma.cc/AQ3W-VUH5] (last modified 16 April 2019). See also Chantelle 
Bramley, “Addressing Indebtedness in Canada: An Evaluation of the Final Report by the Taskforce on 
Financial Literacy” (2012) 27:4 BFLR 711.
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grasp or interest of many vulnerable consumers.161 Moreover, “literature 
on behavioural economics suggests that consumers tend to underestimate 
risks such as unemployment and be overoptimistic about their repayment 
abilities.”162
Aggravating their plight, consumers are also faced with disparate, 
complex and at times conflicting information relating to financial 
consumer protection and are thus unable to protect their interests when 
initially choosing a financial service or when they realize the negative 
consequences of their financial choices. One simply has to compare the 
provincial cost of credit disclosure requirements prescribing the disclosure 
of the annual percentage rate when communicating cost of borrowing with 
the criminal interest rate provisions prescribing a sixty per cent effective 
annual rate. According to a recent study on high-cost credit in Canada, 
“[m]ost lenders cap rates at 46.9% Annual Percentage Rate (APR) the 
equivalent of 60% Effectice Annual Rate (EAR) set in the federal Criminal 
Code.”163 Regardless, most financial consumers do not understand either.
The fact remains, therefore, that for many Canadians struggling with 
financial literacy, cost of credit disclosure requirements are insufficient 
to enable them to make proper financial decisions and fails to prevent 
irresponsible and financially dangerous use of high credit products as 
well as consumer abuse and predatory lending practices. Given the 
foregoing, cost of credit disclosure legislation remains largely ineffective 
for consumers who need the most protection. Iain Ramsay’s conclusion in 
2006 remains true to this day: “Canada has in general not attempted to use 
disclosure law as a method of addressing potential overindebtedness.”164 
Furthermore, existing credit disclosure provisions will not remedy 
consumer exploitation and increased regulatory intervention in the 
marketplace is thus justified to protect financial consumers.165
161. Ramsay, “Overindebtedness,” supra note 11 at 39; Duggan, supra note 158 at 702.
162. Ramsay, “Overindebtedness,” supra note 11 at 39. See also Bramley, supra note 160 at 716-717; 
Waldron, “A Brief History,” supra note 32 at 318.
163. Denise Barrett Consulting, Consumers’ Experience with Higher Cost Credit, (Toronto: 
Consumers Council of Canada, 2018) at 4, 216, online (pdf): CCC <https://cccshop.consumerscouncil.
com/ca/EPUBViewer?PID=139982&GUID=8a5b086f-cb87-4ff3-9c77-d71b5c235989>  [https://
perma.cc/22D6-7527] [Barrett, Higher Cost Credit].
164. Ramsay, “Overindebtedness,” supra note 11 at 38.
165. Robert R Kerton & Idris Ademuyiwas, “Financial Consumer Protection in Canada: Triumphs and 
Tribulations” in Tsai-Jyh Chen, ed, An International Comparison of Financial Consumer Protection, 
(Singapore: Springer, 2018) at 105-107; Waldron, “A Brief History,” supra note 32 at 320. 
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4. Fair trade practices legislation166
Following disclosure requirements and relief for unconscionable credit 
transactions, many provinces enacted relatively quickly legislation that 
protected consumers from unfair or deceptive business practices before, 
during or after a consumer transaction.167 Although initially enacted as 
separate statutes, most provinces have now incorporated them in their 
general consumer protection legislation.168 
Explaining the objectives of fair trade practices legislation, the Alberta 
Government indicates that the Consumer Protection Act “[e]nhances 
consumer protection through remedies, enforcement tools and tougher 
penalties intended to discourage unfair practices in the marketplace. 
The Act simplifies procedures for business, providing clearer standards 
to ensure a more level playing field.”169 Uniquely and interestingly, the 
Alberta statute’s preamble further clarifies the policy objectives targeted 
by this type of legislation:
WHEREAS all consumers have the right to be safe from unfair 
business practices, the right to be properly informed about products and 
transactions, and the right to reasonable access to redress when they have 
been harmed;
166. See generally: Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (online), Commercial Law II (Consumer Protection), 
“Contracts: Unfair Practices and Consumer Contracts: Prohibited Practices General” (I.2(1)) at HCP-2 
“By suppliers of consumer products and services” (2020 Reissue).
167. (AB) The Unfair Trade Practices Act, SA 1975, c 33; (BC) Trade Practices Act, SBC 1974, c 
96; (MB) The Trade Practices Inquiry Act, SM 1935, c 53; (NL) The Trade Practices Act, SNL 1978, 
c 10; (NS) Consumer Services Act, RSNS 1989, c 94; (ON) The Business Practices Act, 1974, SO 
1974, c 131; Business Practices Act, SO 1980, c 55; (PEI) Business Practices Act, SPEI 1977, c 31; 
Conduct of Creditors Regulations, PEI Reg EC1983-578; (SK) The Consumer Protection Act, SS 
1996 c C-30.1. See also Ronald I Cohen & Jacob S Ziegel, The Political and Constitutional Basis 
for a New Trade Practices Act (Ottawa: Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Bureau of 
Competition Policy, 1976).
168. (AB) Fair Trading Act, RSA 2000, c F-2, Part 9 (name and chapter number changed to Consumer 
Protection Act, supra note 144 [AB-CPA] by SA 2017, c 18, s 1(2), effective 15 December 2017); 
Consumer Transaction Cancellation and Recovery Notice Regulation, Alta Reg 287/2006. (BC) 
BC-BPCPA, supra note 124, Part 2, Division I; (MB) The Business Practices Act, SM 1990–1991 
c 6; (NB) Unfair practices provisions are found throughout various legislation applicable to specific 
industries, products or services; (NL) NL-CPBPA, supra note 124, s 7, 9-10; (NS) generally Consumer 
Services Act, supra note 167; NS-CPA, supra note 135, s 33; No regulation adopted to date specifically 
on unfair practices; (NU) NU-CPA, supra note 124, ss 72.1–72.5 added by SNu 2017, c 18, s 3; (ON) 
ON-CPA, supra note 154, Schedule A, ss 14-19; (PEI) Business Practices Act, RSPEI 1988, c B-7, s 
2; Conduct of Creditors Regulations, supra note 167; QC-CPA, supra note 82, ss 219-222, 229; (SK) 
Consumer Protection and Business Practices Act, SS 2014, c C-30.2, ss 6-9. See generally: Halsbury’s 
Laws of Canada, supra note 146.
169. Alberta Government, Consumer Protection Act, online: <open.alberta.ca/dataset/c26p3> [https://
perma.cc/9M49-KFLK]. See also AB-CPA, supra note 144, modified by SA 2017, c 18 and SA 2018, 
c 11. 
Consumer Credit in Canada:  A Regulatory Patchwork 733
WHEREAS businesses thrive when a balanced marketplace is promoted 
and when consumers have confidence that they will be treated fairly and 
ethically by members of an industry;
WHEREAS businesses that comply with legal rules should not be 
disadvantaged by competing against those that do not; and
WHEREAS the Government of Alberta is committed to protecting 
consumers and businesses from unfair practices to support a prosperous 
and vibrant economy.170
Generally, an unfair or deceptive practice takes the form of a claim, 
representation or advertisement that would likely mislead or deceive a 
consumer or be unconscionable and take advantage of a person’s inability 
to protect their interests during negotiations. Although terminology varies 
from province to province, consumer protection legislation applicable 
to consumer credit transactions expressly prohibits certain practices by 
suppliers of consumer products and providers of financial services and 
governs practices within the consumer credit industry. Indeed, many distinct 
unfair practices, usually more than twenty, are specifically enumerated 
in the provincial statutes and these lists are generally non-exhaustive. In 
many provincial statutes, the list of unfair practices is classified in two 
categories: false, misleading or deceptive practices, or unconscionable 
practices.171 Another categorization distinguishes practices pertaining 
to the content of the contract of sale of goods and services from other 
practices relating to the process that resulted in the contract.172
Recent reforms not yet in force to the Alberta Consumer Protection 
Act further prohibit unilateral changes to a “substantive term” unless the 
consumer consents or the change is permitted in the consumer contract 
and notice is given to the consumer as prescribed by the Act.173 In the latter 
event, the consumer retains the right to “cancel the ongoing consumer 
transaction by providing the supplier with a written notice of cancellation” 
without any penalties. 
Many provincial statutes further provide that an unfair practice may 
occur whether or not it resulted in a consumer transaction. For example, 
the Ontario Consumer Protection Act, 2002 provides simply that it is 
an unfair practice for a person to make a false, misleading, deceptive or 
an unconscionable representation and as a result any agreement may be 
170. AB-CPA, supra note 144, Preamble.
171. See in-depth analysis of unfair practices legislation in Edward P Belobaba, “Unfair Trade 
Practices Legislation: Symbolism and Substance in Consumer Protection” (1977) 15:2 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 327 at 345-356.
172. Union des consommateurs, supra note 133 at 40.
173. AB-CPA, supra note 144, ss 6.1–6.2 modified by SA 2017, c 18 (not in force). 
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rescinded and the consumer entitled to a remedy.174 Unlike the earlier 
Business Practices Act, the new provisions no longer require that the 
consumer be induced to enter into the agreement by the misrepresentation.175 
Confirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal, “a claim under the Consumer 
Protection Act based on an agreement entered into following an unfair 
practice does not require any reliance on or even knowledge of the unfair 
practice.”176 This is in contrast to several provinces that still require either 
that the consumer was induced to enter into the contract by the unfair 
practice or that damages were caused by the unfair practice.
Several provinces grant the consumer the right to rescind an agreement, 
or the courts the power to set aside agreements whether written, oral or 
implied, when a supplier or creditor has engaged in an unfair practice.177 
However, the right to rescission or to damages is dependent in some 
jurisdictions upon notice being provided to the supplier within a certain 
time frame. When a supplier has engaged in an unfair practice, a consumer 
may be entitled to various remedies including damages, the recovery of 
the amount paid by the consumer which exceeds the value of the goods or 
services received, and even exemplary or punitive damages. 
In addition, some provincial statutes grant the Court the power to make 
a declaratory or an injunctive order and to impose a criminal sanction 
against the supplier. Both these private and public enforcement provisions 
are “designed to achieve a combination of sanctions and procedures 
calculated to maximize the objectives of deterrence, compensation and 
efficiency.”178 The effectiveness of these consumer protection provisions 
were, however, quickly disputed. William Neilson’s research on the public 
administrative remedies in provincial trade practices legislation revealed, 
in 1981, the “prevailing failure to administer the trade practices statutes 
in an accessible, comprehensive and regular fashion. […] Accountability 
has taken on a very muted and sporadic meaning.”179 According to Jacob 
Ziegel, private enforcement cases are also limited given two main obstacles 
consumers must surmount to benefit from the legislative remedies enacted 
174. ON-CPA, supra note 154, Part III, ss 14-18.
175. Thomas R Lipton, “Consumer Protection Act 2002: Case Law Updates” (2018) 61:1 Can Bus LJ 
109 at 118. 
176. Ramdath v George Brown College of Applied Arts and Technology, 2015 ONCA 921 at paras 39, 
86-87.
177. See Appendix B for citations to statutory provisions. See also Belobaba, supra note 171 at 356-
374; Union des consommateurs, supra note 133 at 42-43; Ziegel, “Consumer Insolvencies,” supra 
note 34 at 387.
178. William AW Neilson, “Administrative Remedies: The Canadian Experience with Assurances of 
Voluntary Compliance in Provincial Trade Practices Legislation” (1982) 19:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 153 at 
155.
179. Ibid at 164-165.
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to protect them.180 Not only must an aggrieved consumer prove that the 
creditor made a “representation,” but also they must personally finance the 
litigation costs involved in the process. 
Although a recent conviction in Ontario against a contracting company 
has “resulted in one of the largest fines and longest jail terms imposed 
under the Consumer Protection Act,”181 the Province’s website lists only 
seven conviction notices for the last 27 months. In comparison, there are 
387 records on the Consumer Beware List of businesses that have either 
been convicted or have not responded to the ministry about a consumer 
complaint.182 Given the number of complaints, the actual enforcement 
measures seem quite inconsequential and raise the issue of whether 
consumer protection measures have ever been effectively enforced.
5. Payday loans legislation
The emergence of new forms of consumer credit such as payday loans 
has recently prompted renewed lobbying efforts aimed at provincial 
governments to combat predatory lending and better protect financial 
consumers. Although their presence in the United States can be traced 
back to the 1980s, the payday loan industry emerged in Canada in the early 
to mid-1990s.183 Less than twenty years later, payday lenders became the 
most visible and important service provider in the alternative consumer 
credit market offering small short-term unsecured loans. Provided that the 
borrower has an identity card, a bank account and a source of income, 
payday lenders will make the loan without checking the consumer’s credit 
report nor the borrower’s outstanding indebtedness and even promote this 
“flexibility” to potential consumers and “guarantee” approval.184 Many 
180. Ziegel, “Consumer Insolvencies,” supra note 34 at 387.
181. Ontario, Ministry of Government and Consumer Services, “Toronto Contracting Company and 
Owner Each Convicted for 11 Counts of Engaging in an Unfair Practice” (9 August 2019), online: 
Ontario Newsroom <news.ontario.ca/mgs/en/2019/08/toronto-contracting-company-and-owner-each-
convicted-for-11-counts-of-engaging-in-an-unfair-practice.html> [https://perma.cc/3H49-SES8]. The 
contracting company was fined a total of $1.125 million and its director was sentenced to 731 days in 
jail.
182. Ontario, “Consumer Beware List,” online: Ontario <https://www.consumerbewarelist.mgs.gov.
on.ca/en/cbl/search> [https://perma.cc/MY24-FQMU] (last consulted 21 December 2019).
183. Re The Cash Store Financial Services Inc, 2009 MBCA 1 at para 3 [Re The Cash Store].
184. Ben-Ishai, “Regulating Payday Lenders,” supra note 106 at 331; ACORN Canada, A Conflict 
of Interest: How Canada’s Largest Banks Support Predatory Lending, (March 2007) at 4, online: 
ACORN Canada <acorncanada.org/resource/conflict-interest-how-canadas-largest-banks-support-
predatory-lending> [https://perma.cc/3AEB-MWKX]; Brian Dijkema & Rhys McKendry, Banking at 
the Margins, Finding Ways to Build an Enabling Small-Dollar Credit Market (Hamilton, ON: Cardus, 
February 2016) at 35, online (pdf): Cardus <www.cardus.ca/research/work-economics/reports/
banking-on-the-margins/> [https://perma.cc/J36P-P55Q]; Denise Barrett Consulting, Consumer 
Experiences with Online Payday Loans (Toronto: Consumers Council of Canada, July 2015) at 35, 
online (pdf): CCFA <canadiancfa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/consumers-council-canada-
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lenders do, however, evaluate to some extent the borrower’s ability to 
repay based on the value of the loan relative to the client’s expected future 
income in order to determine the associated risk with the loan.185 
Since payday loans are intended primarily for individuals unable to 
access other forms of credit, the industry is often criticized and described 
as predatory, but is also considered by many as a form of microlending 
filling a gap in the consumer credit market to alleviate short term financial 
distress.186 Jacob Ziegel explains, however, that “borrowing costs are too 
high and may often leave the borrowers worse off than they were before 
the loan.”187 Indeed, a Manitoba study estimated in 2007 that a $250 
payday loan with a twelve-day maturity would require an average annual 
rate of 778% instead of regular lines of credit and credit card with interest 
rates of ten to thirty-six per cent.188 Moreover, the annual rates charged by 
payday lenders increased by forty-two and one half per cent between 2002 
and 2007. An ACORN Canada report further indicated that same year 
that payday lenders were charging interest rates between 380 and 900%, 
thus violating section 347 of the Criminal Code, which sets the criminal 
interest rate at sixty per cent.189
In addition to the high costs involved, the critical issue with payday 
loans is the short-term nature of the loan. In order to limit their risk, lenders 
usually structure the repayment period according to the consumer’s next 
inflow of funds such as a paycheque and require a pre-authorized debit 
online-loans_2015-study.pdf> [https://perma.cc/QK4G-2LV4] [Barrett, Online Payday Loans]; 
Consumer Measures Committee, Stakeholder Consultation Document on a Proposed Consumer 
Protection Framework for the Alternative Consumer Credit Market (14 December 2004) at 8 [CMC, 
Stakeholder Consultation].
185. Barrett, Higher Cost Credit, supra note 163 at 50; Dijkema & McKendry, supra note 184 at 35.
186. Freya Kodar, “Conceptions of Borrowers and Lenders in the Canadian Payday Loan Regulatory 
Process: The Evidence from Manitoba and Nova Scotia” (2011) 34:2 Dal LJ 443; Ben-Ishai, 
“Regulating Payday Lenders,” supra note 106 at 325-330; Ruth E Berry & Karen A Duncan, “The 
Importance of Payday Loans in Canadian Consumer Insolvency” (Ottawa: Office of the Superintendent 
of Bankruptcy, October 2007) at 3, online (pdf): OSB <www.startegis.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/vwapj/
Payday_EN.pdf/$FILE/Payday_EN.pdf> [https://perma.cc/LQ34-E3F6]; Jerry Buckland, Payday 
Lending Literature Review (3 May 2013) at 14, online (pdf): Manitoba Public Utilities Board <www.
pub.gov.mb.ca/payday_loan/buckland_payday_literature_review_may%203_13.pdf> [https://perma.
cc/4MYE-MDAK]; Janis P Sarra, “At What Cost? Access to Consumer Credit in a Post-Financial 
Crisis Canada” in Janis P Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2011 (Toronto: Thomson 
Reuters, 2012) 409 at 419. For an in-depth description of these two types of customer segments see: 
Sabrina Bond, Filling the Gap: Canada’s Payday Lenders (Ottawa: Conference Board of Canada, 
2016) at 27–31, online (pdf): CCFA <https://canadiancfa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/cboc-
filling-the-gap_final-nov-2016.pdf> [https://perma.cc/3NZF-LXG2].
187. Ziegel, “Consumer Insolvencies,” supra note 34 at 368.
188. J Buckland et al, Serving or Exploiting People Facing a Short-term Credit Crunch: A Study of 
Consumer Aspects of Payday Lending in Manitoba, Report for the November 2007 Public Utilities 
Board Hearing to Cap Payday Loan Fees (15 September 2007) at 8-9.
189. Criminal Code, supra note 51, s 347; ACORN Canada, supra note 184 at 4. 
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or a post-dated cheque for the total loan amount including fees.190 It is 
imperative to understand, however, that the consumers targeted by this 
type of loan often do not have the necessary surplus in their budget to repay 
the loan since, if they did, they would never have resorted to it in the first 
place. More importantly, a recent study has confirmed that the majority of 
these loans are used for recurring or necessary expenses191 which signifies 
that the consumer is most likely already financially distressed or living 
paycheque to paycheque. As a result, the nature of a payday loan and the 
two-week repayment period represents a short period of time to recover 
the amount needed.
Repayment of the payday loan along with additional costs not only 
delays the consumer’s burden of illiquidity to the next paycheque but 
also increases the consumer’s overall indebtedness. Additional loans are 
therefore required to stay financially afloat or may even be required to 
repay the initial loan and thus continues to add to a borrower’s financial 
hardship. “For consumers who are never able to get completely ahead of 
the deficit left by a loan payment in their cash-flow cycle, the result can 
be a crippling cycle of debt that lasts until the individual receives a large-
enough influx of cash such as a tax return.”192
The obvious potential for profits explains why payday loan companies 
encourage their customers to extend the term of the loan or to take out 
another loan to repay the first, rather than encouraging borrowers to pay 
their debts. According to a recent study on payday loans, “the business 
model of the payday loan industry requires repeat borrows, not one-
time customers” and, prior to recent legislative reforms prohibiting the 
practice, loans were regularly rolled over into new loans (on average 15 
190. Dijkema & McKendry, supra note 184 at 35; Canada, “Payday Loans” (modified 12 November 
2019), online: Canada <www.canada.ca/en/financial-consumer-agency/services/loans/payday-loans.
html> [https://perma.cc/28JZ-TDH8].
191. Financial Consumer Agency of Canada, “Payday Loans: Market Trends” (2016) at 1, online: 
FCAC <www.canada.ca/en/financial-consumer-agency/programs/research/payday-loans-market-
trends.html> [https://perma.cc/6S2Y-EFJG] [FCAC, Market Trends]. See also Manitoba Public 
Utilities Board, Report on 2016 Payday Loans Review (17 June 2016) at 38, online (pdf): <www.
pubmanitoba.ca/v1/payday_loan/2016_payday_loans_review_report.pdf> [https://perma.cc/7KL5-
SVW5]; Jerry Buckland & Brenda Spotton Visano, “Introduction” in Buckland, Robinson & Visano, 
Payday Lending in Canada, supra note 18 at 2 [Buckland & Visano, “Introduction”]; Jerry Buckland, 
“A Socio-economic Examination of Payday Loan Clients: Why and How People Use Payday Loans,” 
in Buckland, Robinson & Visano, Payday Lending in Canada, supra note 18 at 75 [Buckland, “A 
Socio-economic Examination”].
192. Dijkema & McKendry, supra note 184 at 35. See also Ben-Ishai, “Regulating Payday Lenders,” 
supra note 106 at 327 citing Carmen Butler & Niloufar Park, “Mayday Payday: Can Corporate Social 
Responsibility Save Payday Lenders?” (2005) 3:1 Rutgers JL & Urban Policy 119 at 122; Manitoba 
Public Utilities Board, supra note 191 at 61; Buckland & Visano, “Introduction,” supra note 191 at 11.
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times as reported by Ernst & Young in 2004).193 According to the Nova 
Scotia Utility and Review Board’s analysis of 2017 statistics,194 repeat 
loans represented fifty-six per cent of total payday loan borrowing in the 
Province. In addition, almost fifty per cent of borrowers had five or more 
payday loans in one year and thirty-two per cent had eight or more.
There are several factors that can make a person opt for this type of 
credit. “Borrowers find payday loans attractive because of the accessibility 
of the payday loan outlets, the privacy of the transactions, the absence 
of credit checks, and non-requirement of security for repayment of the 
loan.”195 For financial consumers “concerned about their ability to manage 
the more open-ended commitment associated with credit card cash 
advances,” payday loans provide a highly structured short-term loan.196 
Payday lenders seem to be “non-judgmental” and friendlier, especially 
with the proactive offer of services in the language of the dominant ethnic 
group in the neighborhood, and more accessible both in terms of hours of 
operation and location.197 For example, in many Canadian cities, banks 
tend to close their branches in low-income or rural neighborhoods, while 
payday lenders take the opportunity to move into these areas.198
In 2008, there were approximately 1,450 payday lenders in Canada, 
with an estimated turnover of $2 billion, most of them in low-income 
neighborhoods.199 It was contemplated at that time that the payday loan 
industry could double in size when it would reach maturity.200 Although 
the use of payday loans by consumers has more than doubled in Canada 
between 2009 and 2016 to more than four per cent of Canadian households 
193. Chris Robinson, “A Business Analysis of The Payday Loan Industry,” in Buckland, Robinson & 
Visano, Payday Lending in Canada, supra note 18 at 95; ACORN Canada, supra note 184 at 4.
194. NSUARB, supra note 135 at para 102.
195. Ziegel, “Consumer Insolvencies,” supra note 34 at 367; Buckland, Hard Choices, supra note 15 
at 100-117; Margaret Craig-Bourdi, “High-Interest Loans: Why Canadian Borrowers Are Still Taking 
on the Steep Commitment” (13 August 2018) online: CPA <www.cpacanada.ca/en/news/canada/2018-
08-13-high-interest-loans-why-canadian-borrowers-are-still-taking-on-the-steep-commitment> 
[https://perma.cc/8YFS-V34F]. See also Buckland, “A Socio-economic Examination,” supra note 191 
at 75-76.
196. Ramsay, “Payday Loans,” supra note 9 at 389.
197. Ben-Ishai, “Regulating Payday Lenders,” supra note 106 at 330.
198. ACORN Canada, supra note 184 at 2. In 2004, it was reported that that more than 700 bank 
branches were closed in Canada between 2001 and 2003, most in low-income neighbourhoods; 
Buckland, Hard Choices, supra note 15 at 152.
199. Finn Poschmann, An Assessment of Payday Lending: Markets and Regulatory Responses 
(October 2016) at 14, online (pdf): Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, <www.apec-econ.ca/files/
documents/Payday%20Lending%20Report.pdf> [https://perma.cc/6EE9-YJJG]; Ziegel, “Consumer 
Insolvencies,” supra note 34 at 367; Buckland, Hard Choices, supra note 15 at 148-149; Buckland 
& Visano, “Introduction,” supra note 191 at 3-4. For in-depth analysis of payday loan industry see 
Robinson, supra note 193 at 83-125.
200. Re The Cash Store, supra note 183 at para 3.
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or two million Canadians each year,201 the number of lenders has not 
increased significantly. The number of payday lenders peaked in 2011 
with 1,778 lenders but recent provincial regulatory reforms beginning in 
2009 has transformed the industry which has consolidated and returned to 
previous levels with approximately 1,400 lenders.202 Store front payday 
lenders are now found in all provinces except Québec where, as previously 
explained in Part III, section 1 on pawnbrokers, relatively low interest rate 
restrictions discouraged the industry from developing in that province.203 
Amidst calls for the outright prohibition of payday loans, the federal, 
provincial and territorial governments began in 2000 to address the 
exploitation of vulnerable customers and the charging of exorbitant rates 
and fees by payday lenders. However, instead of banning payday loans, 
governments tailored their response to legalize the industry, which was 
threatened as a result of numerous class actions brought against payday 
loan companies in Canada claiming that section 347 of the Criminal Code 
has been violated.204 Notwithstanding the accuracy of these allegations 
there had been few prosecutions and these were essentially focused on 
organized crime or “the most egregious of violations.”205 According to the 
federal Department of Justice, the criminal interest rate was a means to 
target loan sharking and was “not intended to act as a consumer protection 
tool.”206
Considering the regulation of payday loans “a consumer-protection 
issue,” Parliament authorized the provinces in 2007 to regulate the payday 
lending industry and to set their own limits on the cost of payday loans.207 
201. FCAC, Market Trends, supra note 191 at 1-2.
202. Poschmann, supra note 199 at 13-18; Bond, supra note 186 at 5-8.
203. For further details, see supra, notes 105 and 106.
204. Nathan Irving, “The Consumer Protection Amendment Act (Payday Loans)” (2001) 34:3 Man 
LJ 159 at 160-163.
205. Consumer Measures Committee, ACCM Working Group, Consultation Paper on Framework 
Options for Addressing Concerns with the Alternative Consumer Credit Market (2002) at 4, online 
(pdf): FedDev Ontario <www.feddevontario.gc.ca/eic/site/cmc-cmc.nsf/vwapj/CMC_credit_e.
pdf/$FILE/CMC_credit_e.pdf> [https://perma.cc/G5RS-W73H]: “Section 347 is not well suited to 
enforcement within the ACCM, despite many ACCM credit products being sold at arguably criminal 
interest rates. Enforcement difficulties include a lack of victims willing to aid prosecutions, a low 
level of harm done in relation to each individual ACCM loan, costly evidentiary requirements, and the 
uncommon requirement for specific Attorney General consent for actions (taken by some prosecutors 
to mean that this section is to be applied only in special circumstances).” See also CMC, Stakeholder 
Consultation, supra note 184 at 2; Mary Anne Waldron, “What is to be Done with Section 347?” 
(2003) 38:3 Can Bus LJ 367 at 368 [Waldron, “What is to be Done”]; Tracy v Instaloans Financial 
Solutions Centres, 2009 BCCA 110 at para 4.
206. Barrett, Higher Cost Credit, supra note 163 at 218. See also CMC, Stakeholder Consultation, 
supra note 184 at 2.
207. Buckland, Hard Choices, supra note 15 at 50-51; Criminal Code, supra note 51, s 347.1; 
Order Designating Alberta for the Purposes of the Criminal Interest Rate Provisions of the Criminal 
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Since then, almost every province in Canada has decided to regulate and 
tighten rules governing the payday loan industry and, in particular, loans 
for $1,500 or less with a term of 62 days or less as defined in the Criminal 
Code.208
With the exception of Québec, which regulates all high-cost credit 
generally, all provinces have enacted legislative schemes designed to 
protect borrowers of payday loans by requiring payday lenders to be 
licensed and by regulating the payday lending industry.209 As detailed in 
Appendix C, legislation in most provinces prescribes the contents of a 
payday loan agreement ensuring disclosure of all relevant information 
in clear and comprehensible terms including loan principal, duration in 
days, maturity, total cost of credit and annual percentage rate, a statement 
that the loan is a high-cost loan and the details of the fees, commissions, 
penalties, interest, charges and other amounts required in respect of the 
loan. Likewise, specific information must be posted prominently showing 
the total cost of credit and all other prescribed information. Legislation also 
Code, SOR/2010-21; Order Designating  British Columbia for the Purposes of the Criminal Interest 
Rate Provisions of the Criminal Code, SOR/2009-278; Order Designating Manitoba for the Purposes 
of the Criminal Interest Rate Provisions of the Criminal Code, SOR/2008-212; Order Designating New 
Brunswick for the Purposes of the Criminal Interest Rate Provisions of the Criminal Code, SOR/2017-
40; Order Designating Nova Scotia for the Purposes of the Criminal Interest Rate Provisions of the 
Criminal Code, SOR/2009-177; Order Designating Ontario for the Purposes of the Criminal Interest 
Rate Provisions of the Criminal Code, SOR/2009-277; Order Designating Prince Edward Island for 
the Purposes of the Criminal Interest Rate Provisions of the Criminal Code, SOR/2014-277; Order 
Designating Saskatchewan for the Purposes of the Criminal Interest Rate Provisions of the Criminal 
Code, SOR/2011-204. See in-depth analysis of the transition to provincial regulation in Olena Kobzar, 
“Perils of Governance through Networks: The Case of Regulating Payday Lending in Canada” (2012) 
34:1 Law & Policy 32. See also critiques of this decision: Waldron, “A Brief History,” supra note 32 
at 315; Waldron, “What is to be Done,” supra note 205; Jacob Ziegel, “Does Section 347 Deserve a 
Second Chance? A Comment” (2003) 38:3 Can Bus LJ 394; Garland v Consumers’ Gas Co, [1998] 3 
SCR 112 at 121, 165 DLR (4th) 385.
208. Criminal Code, supra note 51, s 347.1(2).
209. (AB) An Act to End Predatory Lending, SA 2016, c E-9.5, (CIF May 27, 2016) [Predatory 
Lending Act]; AB-CPA, supra note 144, ss 124.1–124.91, as amended by Predatory Lending Act, s 8; 
Payday Loans Regulation, Alta Reg 157/2009; (BC) BC-BPCPA, supra note 124, Part 6.1; Payday 
Loans Regulation, BC Reg 57/2009; (MB) MB-CPA, supra note 143, Part XVIII; Payday Loans 
Regulation, Man Reg 99/2007; (NB) NB-CCDPLA, supra note 154; Payday Lending Regulation, NB 
Reg 2017-23 (CIF 1 January 2018); (NL) NL-CPBPA, supra note 124, ss 83.1–83.11 as amended 
by An Act to Amend the Consumer Protection and Business Practices Act, SNL 2016, c 46 (CIF 1 
April 2019); Payday Loans Regulations, NLR 10/19; Payday Loans Licensing Regulations, NLR 
11/19; (NS) NS-CPA, supra note 135, ss 18A–18U; Payday Lenders Regulations, NS Reg 248/2009, 
s 9; (ON) Payday Loans Act, 2008, SO 2008, c 9 [ON-PLA]; General Regulation, O Reg 98/09 
[ON-General]; (PEI) Payday Loans Act, SPEI 2009, c 83; Payday Loans Act Regulations, PEI Reg 
EC2013-67; (SK) Payday Loans Act, SS 2007, c P-4.3; The Payday Loans Regulations, RRS c P-4.3, 
Reg 1 [The Payday Loans Regulations]. See also(QC) QC-CPA, supra note 82, ss 66-117, 150, 321b, 
322; QC-Consumer Protection Regulation, supra note 154, chapter 5 applicable to all money lenders 
in Québec. See generally: Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (online), Commercial Law II (Consumer 
Protection), “Financing Protection: High-Cost Credit” (II.6) at HCP-39 “Definitions” (2020 Reissue).
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provides for a “cooling off” period, meaning consumers are permitted to 
change their minds and cancel a payday loan within 1 to 2 days depending 
on the jurisdiction, without paying any charges. 
Regulation of payday loans further enumerates acceptable debt 
collection practices and prohibited practices for lenders such as requesting 
or requiring any assignment of wages or other security for the payment 
of the loan and tied selling other products or services. If a payday lender 
fails to comply with a number of provisions on prohibited practices, the 
borrower is not liable to pay any amount that exceeds the principal of the 
payday loan. 
In addition to the general maximum cap of $1,500, provincial 
legislation also restricts the principal amount borrowed by the consumer 
and sets additional maximums on the total cost of borrowing that payday 
lenders can charge consumers with the amount varying with each province. 
Since 2015, the tendency has been to lower the maximum total cost of 
credit allowed, which currently stands, in Alberta, British Columbia, New 
Brunswick and Ontario, at $15 per $100 advanced under the payday loan 
including all charges and fees.210 Prior to these reforms, limits placed on 
borrowing costs have ranged from $17 to $31 for every $100. Although 
this lower price cap may seem reasonable when represented in a dollar 
amount, the calculation of the APR for such loans at the lowest rate in 
Canada is at least eighty-eight per cent for a loan for the maximum term of 
62 days and almost 392% for a standard two-week loan.211 
A few recent legislative reforms include further restrictions on the 
allowable amount of a payday loan. As a result, the maximum amount of 
a payday loan in British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador, Ontario 
and Saskatchewan is fifty per cent of the borrower’s net pay while it is 
only thirty per cent in Manitoba and New Brunswick.212 In addition, new 
provisions enacted in most provinces prohibit rollovers or concurrent loans 
210. AB-CPA, supra note 144, s 124.61; (BC) Payday Loans Regulation, supra note 209, s 17 as 
amended by BC Reg 126/2018 (effective 1 September 2018); (NB) Payday Lending Regulation, supra 
note 209, s 3; (ON) ON-General, supra note 209, s 18(1) as amended by O Reg 489/17 (15% after 1 
January 2018).
211. Financial and Consumer Services Commission, “Unlicensed Online Payday Lenders are 
Operating in New Brunswick” (26 November 2018), online: FCNB <www2.gnb.ca/content/gnb/
en/news/news_release.2018.11.1289.html> [https://perma.cc/3EN5-72B9]; Consumer Protection 
BC, “Calculate the payday loan APR” (2020), online: Consumer Protection BC <https://www.
consumerprotectionbc.ca/get-keep-licence/payday-loans/calculate-the-payday-loan-apr/> [https://
perma.cc/B2AU-RR6G].
212. (BC) BC-BPCPA, supra note 124, ss 112.02, 112.08; Payday Loans Regulation, BC Reg 
231/2016, s 18; (MB) MB-CPA, supra note 143, s 151.1; Payday Loans Regulation, supra note 209, 
s 15.2; (NL) Payday Loans Regulations, supra note 209, s 3(1)(g); (ON) ON-PLA, supra note 209; 
ON-General, supra note 209, s 16.2; (SK) The Payday Loans Regulations, supra note 209, s 15.
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by a single lender. Undoubtedly improving consumer protection, these new 
consumer protection measures nevertheless contain glaring loopholes: 
borrowers may still be granted several succeeding loans by a single lender 
or can have many concurrent loans from multiple lenders. Despite the harm 
caused to vulnerable consumers and a favourable recommendation from 
the Utility and Review Board, Nova Scotia has refused to amend current 
regulation since enforcing restrictions on repeat or concurrent loans from 
multiple lenders would require loan-tracking databases which would not 
be “feasible because of privacy implications and cost.”213 
Rather than tracking loans and restricting the availability of credit, four 
provinces have recently enacted new provisions to reduce the financial 
hardship caused by these recurring high-cost loans. Payday lenders must 
now allow a borrower who has taken out two or more loans in a 62-day 
period to repay any subsequent loans over a longer period of at least 42 
days and no more than 62 days regardless of any other term stated in the 
payday loan agreement.214 This prescribed instalment plan allows the 
borrower to repay the loan over a longer period time and numerous pay 
periods thus reducing the financial burden of repaying the debt especially 
on a fixed income. 
Although these new provisions represent good news for consumers, 
they also represent significant financial constraints on lenders in the 
payday loan industry. According to a research report prepared for the 
Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, the combined effect of the lower 
cost and longer borrowing time “will increase the quantity of financial 
capital required to fund a given loan volume, and raise operating costs per 
loan issued. This will decrease the number of loans that are issued, and 
loans issued will become more costly to provide.”215
As a result, many provinces such as Alberta and Ontario have seen 
a noticeable reduction in the number of licensed lenders in the province 
as well as a consolidation and corporatization of existing lenders with 
Money Mart capturing approximately fifty per cent of the entire payday 
lending market.216 As noted by the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board, 
213. NSUARB, supra note 135 at paras 99-106, 122. See also the lack of consensus of the Payday 
Lending Panel in Ontario on the issue: Ontario, Strengthening Ontario’s Payday Loans Act: Payday 
Lending Panel Findings and Recommendations Report (May 2014) at 26-27, online (pdf): Ontario 
<www.ontariocanada.com/registry/showAttachment.do?postingId=17182&attachmentId=26292> 
[https://perma.cc/Q273-UZU9] [Ontario, 2014 Payday Loans Report].
214. AB-CPA, supra note 144, s 124.3; (BC) Payday Loans Regulation, supra note 209, s 23; (NL) 
Payday Loans Regulations, supra note 209, s 5(2); (ON) ON-PLA, supra note 209, s 26; ON-General, 
supra note 209, s 25.1.
215. Poschmann, supra note 199 at 3.
216. Brian Dijkema, Banking on the Margins, The Changing Face of Payday Lending in Canada 
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these lenders have either left the payday loan industry altogether thereby 
reducing the number of storefront outlets, or have developed “new short 
term credit products like longer term lines of credit and installment 
loans,” which are excluded from payday loan regulation and therefore the 
object of fewer regulatory constraints.217 To regulate these new high-cost 
credit products, some provinces have enacted new legislation specifically 
regulating these new types of lenders, as will be discussed in Part III, 
section 6. In comparison, New Brunswick has simply prohibited payday 
lenders from extending credit other than payday loans.218
Another consequence of increasingly stringent provincial regulation 
is that these legislative reforms “will deter compliant payday lenders that 
wish to participate in the regulated market, and create an environment 
where unregulated and unlicensed lenders will enter to fill the void.”219 
Several reports have indeed noted the growth of online illegal lenders in 
Canada and globally and the increased access to online and mobile payday 
loans.220
Comparing compliance levels between licensed and illegal lenders, a 
study prepared by the Consumers Council of Canada concluded that while 
“[l]icensed lenders show a high level of compliance with regulations,” 
“[u]nlicensed lenders show virtually no compliance with regulations.”221 
This is exemplified by the warning of the New Brunswick Financial 
and Consumer Services Commission to financial consumers of the risks 
involved in borrowing from unlicensed online payday lenders.222 These 
(Hamilton, ON: Cardus, June 2019) at 11-12, online: Cardus <www.cardus.ca/research/work-
economics/reports/the-changing-face-of-payday-lending-in-canada/> [https://perma.cc/4AFF-3HZ6]; 
Robinson, supra note 193 at 112-113. See also Ian Bickis, “Alberta Payday Loan Regulations 
Has Lenders Starting to Feel Pinch,” CBC News (14 May 2017), online: CBC<www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/calgary/alberta-payday-lenders-suffering-bill-15-1.4114628> [perma.cc/ZX7B-2Q9E]; Reid 
Southwick, “Alberta payday loan crackdown shrinks industry,” CBC News (16 January 2018), online: 
CBC <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/alberta-payday-loan-crackdown-1.4488925> [perma.
cc/B9WR-EQCD]. See contra: Manitoba Public Utilities Board, supra note 191 at 35.
217. NSUARB, supra note 135 at paras 80-81; Dijkema, supra note 216 at 12-13.
218. NB-CCDPLA, supra note 154, s 37.381.
219. NSUARB, supra note 135 at para 77. See also Poschmann, supra note 199 at 30; Barrett, Online 
Payday Loans, supra note 184 at 38; Katrine Dilay & Byron Williams, “Payday Lending Regulations” 
in Buckland, Robinson & Visano, Payday Lending in Canada, supra note 18 at 206.
220. See Bond, supra note 186 at 24-25; Ontario, 2014 Payday Loans Report, supra note 213 at 7, 
9-14; Buckland & Visano, “Introduction,” supra note 191 at 17-21; Robinson, supra note 193 at 99-
100.
221. Barrett, Online Payday Loans, supra note 184 at 6.
222. Financial and Consumer Services Commission, supra note 211. According to the FCNB, 
the following businesses are not licensed in New Brunswick and some are not licensed in any 
Canadian province: truepaydayloan.ca, cash2gonow.com, cashbuddy500.com, cashflow500.ca, 
cashflow500payday.com, creditmontreal500.com, fastmoneyloans.ca, nationalpaydayloan.ca, 
paydayking500.com, pretsohben.com, rapidpaydayloans.net, royalfinances.ca, solutions500.com, 
speedypayloans.ca.
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illegal lenders are not only charging criminal interest rates but are 
indulging in abusive and illegal practices such as collection practices 
involving threats and contacting debtors at their place of employment or 
up to 50 times a day.223 In addition, despite regulatory prohibitions, many 
unlicensed online lenders structure loans to automatically renew224 and it 
has been reported that illegal lenders often ask for fees upfront or direct 
access to a consumer’s bank account, including “account numbers, online 
passwords and answers to security questions.”225
Although “[m]ost, if not all, […] provinces that have regulated the 
payday loan industry have included provisions in their legislation with 
respect to online lenders,”226 the enforcement initiatives against illegal 
online lenders are difficult, given that online lenders are often difficult 
to identify and located outside the authority’s jurisdiction.227 It has been 
recommended that 
[r]egulators should explore criminal charges against lenders who behave 
criminally and have been identified through complaints procedures. 
Lenders who request personal banking information are of particular 
concern, as well as those that claim to be compliant with provincial 
legislation when they are not. They pose a risk not only to would be 
borrower but also to the banking and systems of payments.228
Notwithstanding the existence of the criminal interest rate since 1980 
as well as various provincial sanctions for violations of their consumer 
credit regulations,229 the question remains whether provincial authorities 
have the appetite and resources to enforce their regulations and prosecute 
non-compliant licenced lenders as well as the increasing number of illegal 
lenders in Canada. What is clear, however, is the imperative necessity for 
public enforcement action to protect financial consumers. For example, 
active investigations by the provincial authority, Consumer Protection BC, 
have uncovered illegal practices relating to aggressive and deceptive sales 
of credit insurance, lack of disclosure, misleading representations and 
223. Ibid.
224. Bond, supra note 186 at 25-26.
225. Barrett, Online Payday Loans, supra note 184 at 6, 35.
226. NSUARB, supra note 135 at para 43.
227. Barrett, Online Payday Loans, supra note 184 at 47-48; Dilay & Williams, supra note 219 at 
206.
228. Ibid at 48.
229. See e.g. (AB) Predatory Lending Act, supra note 209, s 6, which prescribes a fine of no less than 
$300,000, or 3 times the amount obtained by the defendant as a result of the offence, or imprisonment 
for a term of not more than 2 years; (NB) NB-CCDPLA, supra note 154, s 51.6(1) whereby a person 
is “liable on conviction, for each offence, if an individual, to a fine of not more than $50,000 or to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or to both, and if a person other than an individual, 
to a fine of not more than $250,000.”
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repayment restrictions; and have resulted in consumer refunds totalling 
close to $900,000.230 
6. Other high-cost credit products legislation
As previously mentioned, the consumer credit industry has continued to 
innovate to avoid stringent new regulatory constraints enacted in recent 
payday legislation. The emergence and growth of unregulated financial 
services providers offering various credit products such as unsecured lines 
of credit, instalment loans, title loans, subprime vehicle loans, pawnbroker 
loans and rent-to-own sales all but confirm that additional regulation 
governing these high-cost credit products is long overdue.231
Although rent-to-own stores have been operated in Canada since the 
1960s, they have not been regulated given the relatively low numbers 
of consumers of these types of financial services.232 These transactions 
involve the sale of a good to a consumer without a down payment or 
credit check and conclude with the transfer of ownership to the consumer 
upon the final instalment in a long-term payment plan.233 A recent study 
elucidates the high cost nature of these products: 
rent-to-own consumers who acquire merchandise through the completion 
of all their periodic payments typically pay 2.0 to 3.4 times the cost of 
purchasing the same merchandise at conventional retailers. This reflects 
two factors. First, consumers typically pay 40 to 100 per cent more 
through periodic payments than if they purchased the item at the outset. 
Second, rent-to-own “buy it today” prices are also typically higher than 
prices at conventional retailers—from 20 per cent higher for refrigerators 
to 150 per cent higher for laptop computers.234
230. Consumer Protection BC, “Consumer Protection BC Uncovered Illegal Practices Relating to 
Aggressive and Deceptive Sales of Credit” (6 December 2018), online: Consumer Protection BC 
<www.consumerprotectionbc.ca/news/bc-payday-lending-regulator-follows-data-trail-to-uncover-
widespread-issues-in-sector-returns-nearly-900000-to-borrowers/> [perma.cc/9BHA-STZX]. 
Another example of public enforcement is found at: Ontario (Director, Ministry of Consumer and 
Business Services Act) v Cash Store Financial Services Inc, 2014 ONSC 980.
231. Ontario, 2014 Payday Loans Report, supra note 213 at 7. See also Joe Fantauzzi, Predatory 
Lending: A Survey of High Interest Alternative Financial Service Users (Toronto: Canadian 
Centre for Policy Alternatives Ontario Office and ACORN Canada, 2016), online: CCPA <www.
policyalternatives.ca/publications/reports/predatory-lending> [perma.cc/NEG8-PYKW].
232. Gail E Henderson & Lauren L Malatesta, “Protecting Low Income Consumers: The Regulation 
of Rent-To-Own Stores” (2019) 61:3 Can Bus LJ 354 at 358–359, 363. See also Denise Barrett 
Consulting, “Consumer Experiences with Rent-to-Own” (Toronto: Consumers Council of Canada, 
2016) at 10, online: CCC <www.consumerscouncil.com/research-reports> [perma.cc/7NV7-FTL8] 
[Barrett, Rent-to-Own].
233. Barrett, Rent-to-Own supra note 232 at 5.
234. Ibid at 6.
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While initial costs and financial charges often by themselves exceed the 
criminal interest rate of 60%, the total cost to consumers of the transactions 
is often unknown given the hidden cost reflected in the increased price 
of the good sold in comparison to similar goods on the market. Other 
concerns with these agreements are the immediate repossession rights 
of the creditor upon default of the debtor, violation of privacy rights and 
aggressive collection tactics.235
In the alternative financial services market, legitimate lenders 
complying with payday lending regulations are compelled to offer more 
profitable products to answer to consumer demand for credit. “According 
to credit reporting agencies, instalment loans are the fastest-growing type 
of credit in Canada.”236 A recent study of these higher-cost credit products 
has also confirmed that the interest charged on these loans are usually set 
just below the criminal interest rate with some financial providers lending 
above the legal limits.237
The increased use of consumer credit and the widening range of high-
cost credit products, such as title loans secured by previously acquired 
personal property, are raising new policy concerns about financial consumer 
protection. Additional measures are therefore undoubtedly required 
considering the potential exploitation of vulnerable consumers and the 
unavailability of immediate short-term loans from traditional financial 
institutions.238 Despite recent legislation governing payday lenders, “[o]nce 
a product is beyond the scope of the payday loan legislation, protections in 
the legislation are not available to consumers.”239 As a result, new forms of 
consumer credit legislation regulating other high-cost credit products are 
being enacted across the country. 
Similar to the licensing requirements for payday lenders, several 
provinces such as New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Québec and 
Saskatchewan have also enacted licensing regimes for other types of 
money lenders.240 While legislation in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia 
235. Henderson & Malatesta, supra note 232 at 362 citing Momentum, “High-Cost Alternative 
Financial Services: Issues and Impact” (June 2017) at 3-4, online (pdf): Momentum <momentum.
org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Part-1-High-Cost-Alternative-Financial-Services_1.pdf> [perma.
cc/5VRP-VALE] [Momentum “Issues and Impact”]; Barrett, Rent-to-Own, supra note 232 at 19, 57-
58.
236. Barrett, Higher Cost Credit, supra note 163 at 3; Robinson, supra note 193 at 102-103.
237. Ibid at 4.
238. Momentum “Issues and Impact,” supra note 235; Fantauzzi, supra note 231 at 5-6.
239. Ontario, 2014 Payday Loans Report, supra note 213 at 15.
240. (NB) NB-CCDPLA, supra note 154, s 6; (NS) NS-CPA, supra note 135, s 11(1); (QC) QC-
CPA, supra note 82, s 321; (SK) Trust and Loan Corporations Act, SS 1997, c T-22.2, s 17(1). See 
also Momentum, Brief to Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, regarding 
Bill S-237, “High-Cost Alternative Financial Services: Policy Options” (September 2017), online 
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covers lenders as well as sellers who want to extend credit or provide 
financing to consumers in these provinces, the regulatory framework in 
Saskatchewan limits licensing requirements to lenders of money, credit 
grantors of revolving credit or purchasers of various types of securities. 
In the remaining provinces and territories, the compliance of other money 
lenders to existing provincial legislation is not supervised by a general 
licensing regime and specific legislation is therefore required. 
To better protect financial consumers turning to high-cost credit 
lenders, Alberta, Manitoba, Québec and British Columbia have recently 
enacted specific legislation amending their consumer protection statutes 
to establish new regimes for high-cost credit which include new licensing 
requirements for high-cost lenders.241 High-cost financial services are 
defined in Manitoba and Alberta as a credit agreement that provides for 
a rate of 32% or more, including the interest rate and all mandatory fees 
and costs involved with the high-cost credit agreement.242 The British 
Columbia statute is not in force and regulations defining “high-cost credit 
product” have not yet been adopted.
The government of Alberta confirms on their website that its wide-
ranging statute applies to fixed high-cost credit products, also referred 
to as ‘instalment’ lending, and can include instalment loans, mortgage 
loans, car loans, vehicle title loans, rent-to-own products, leases and pawn 
loans.243 Open high-cost credit products, or ‘revolving’ lending, such as 
lines of credit, revolving loans, home equity lines of credit, credit cards and 
retail cards are also regulated. In comparison, Manitoba restricted the new 
provisions in its consumer protection statute to various types of unsecured 
loans with a term not exceeding 2 years and a maximum amount of $5,000 
as well as loans secured by personal property which were not purchased 
with the funds advanced.
(pdf): Canada Senate <sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/BANC/Briefs/BANC_S-237_
Momentum_e.pdf>  [perma.cc/88BW-STKD] [Momentum, “Policy Options”].
241. (AB) A Better Deal for Consumers and Businesses Act, SA 2017, c 18; High-Cost Credit 
Regulation, Alta Reg 132/2018 (CIF 1 January 2019) [AB-High-Cost Credit Regulation]; (BC) 
Business Practices and Consumer Protection Amendment Act, 2019, SBC 2019, c 22 (Royal Assent 
on 16 May 2019, not in force); (MB) The Consumer Protection Amendment Act (High-Cost Credit 
Products), SM 2014, c 12 (CIF 1 September 2016); (QC) An Act mainly to modernize rules relating 
to consumer credit and to regulate debt settlement service contracts, high-cost credit contracts and 
loyalty programs, SQ 2017, c 24 (CIF 1 August 2019). See also Dilay & Williams, supra note 219 at 
207-208.
242. (AB) AB-CPA, supra note 144, s 124.01(a); (MB) High-Cost Credit Products Regulation, Man 
Reg 7/2016, s 2.
243. Alberta, “High-cost credit business licence” (2019), online: Alberta <https://www.alberta.ca/
high-cost-credit-business-licence.aspx> [perma.cc/L3MU-Q9QV].
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Furthermore, high-cost credit legislation in Manitoba does not 
apply to regulated payday loans, mortgages, credit cards, margin loans 
or credit extended by banks or credit unions; whereas public utilities, 
life insurance companies, credit unions, municipalities and certain other 
financial institutions are exempt in Alberta.244 In British Columbia, savings 
institutions are exempt as well as other prescribed classes of high-cost 
credit grantors.245 Likewise, in Québec, financial services cooperatives 
and federally regulated financial institutions are exempt from new high-
cost consumer protection measures since they must already “adhere to 
sound and prudent management practices or sound commercial practices 
in consumer credit matters” pursuant to their respective regulatory 
frameworks.246 
In contrast to the other common law jurisdictions, Québec’s regulations 
provide that the new high-cost credit regime is triggered by a floating rate 
when a lender charges a rate which is twenty-two per cent higher than the 
official discount rate of the Bank of Canada at the time the parties enter 
into the credit agreement.247 Significantly lower, it will capture a larger 
subset of lenders including many credit card issuers, all of whom are now 
considered lenders requiring a permit under provincial legislation. 
Most interestingly, 2017 legislative reform in Québec, in force 
since 1 August 2019, requires a merchant, including “any person doing 
business or extending credit in the course of his business,” to complete 
an assessment of a consumer’s capacity to repay the credit requested 
before entering into a credit contract with the consumer or before 
granting a credit limit increase.248 If the credit grantor fails to carry out the 
assessment as prescribed, the right to the credit charges is forfeited and 
must be refunded to the consumer. Moreover, before entering into a high-
cost credit agreement, a credit grantor must provide the consumer with a 
written copy of the assessment of the consumer’s debt ratio and capacity 
to repay the credit. Finally, a new provision clarifies that a “consumer who 
enters into a high-cost credit contract while his debt ratio exceeds the ratio 
determined by regulation is presumed to have contracted an excessive, 
harsh or unconscionable obligation within the meaning of section 8” of 
the Consumer Protection Act, granting the Court the power to nullify a 
244. (AB) AB-High-Cost Credit Regulation, supra note 241, s 13; (MB) MB-CPA, supra note 143, s 
237-238.
245. BC-BPCPA, supra note 124, s 112.32. 
246. QC-CPA, supra note 82, 103.2.
247. (QC) Consumer Protection Regulation, supra note 154, s 61.0.3.
248. QC-CPA, supra note 82, ss 1, 103.2–103-5; QC-Consumer Protection Regulation, supra note 
154, Division II.1, Assessment of Consumer’s Capacity to Repay Credit or Perform Obligations (CIF 
1 August 2019).
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contract to reduce a consumer’s obligations. High-cost lenders will be 
obligated to refute such a presumption in the event a debtor’s obligations 
pursuant to a high-cost credit agreement are contested in court.
Although Ontario has recently completed a consultation with stakeholders 
on high-cost alternative financial services,249 no recommendations nor 
legislative reforms have resulted from the consultation to date. Nonetheless, 
stronger responsible lending requirements are also envisioned in Ontario. 
Reforms enacted in 2017 but not yet in force will permit the adoption of 
regulations “prohibiting lenders from entering into a credit agreement with 
a borrower if the amount of the credit to be extended or money to be lent 
under the agreement exceeds the prescribed amount.”250 A lender will also 
be required to provide to the borrower, before entering into the agreement, 
a copy of the lender’s assessment of the factors prescribed. As explained 
in a recent Ontario government consultation paper, “if too much money is 
lent to a consumer, repaying the loan may be unaffordable, regardless of 
the cost of borrowing” and despite any rollbacks in the cost of credit.251 
These types of responsible lending requirements ensure that vulnerable 
financial consumers do not overextend themselves with a high-cost loan 
leading to further indebtedness and usually to an inevitable bankruptcy.
Recent provincial regulatory frameworks further protect consumers 
by providing a cooling-off period and the right to cancel a credit 
agreement within the prescribed time or to pay back a loan early without 
a fee or penalty.252 Specific disclosure requirements include in-store and 
online disclosures as well as mandatory forms and content of the credit 
agreement. These requirements may create additional administrative 
obstacles for a national lender, given the relatively harmonized previous cost 
of credit disclosure requirements throughout the country.253 A “statement 
249. Ontario, Ministry of Government and Consumer Services, Strengthening Protection for 
Consumers of Alternative Financial Services—Phase One (Summer 2017) [Ontario, Strengthening 
Protection]. See also British Columbia, Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, High-Cost 
Alternative Financial Services Stakeholder Consultation (September 2016), online (pdf): British 
Columbia <forms.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/291/2016/09/high-cost-alt-fin-serv-consult.pdf> 
[perma.cc/P5B4-XYAZ].
250. ON-CPA, supra note 154, Schedule A, s 123(8) as amended by Putting Consumers First Act 
(Consumer Protection Statute Law Amendment), 2017, SO 2017, c 5, Schedule 2, s 20(3) (not in 
force).
251. Ontario, Strengthening Protection, supra note 249 at 5.
252. (AB) AB-CPA, supra note 144, s 68; High-Cost Credit Regulation, supra note 241, s 14(1); AB-
CCDR, supra note 154; (BC) BC-BPCPA, supra note 124, ss 112.20, 112.25; (MB) MB-CPA, supra 
note 143, s 252-253; (QC) QC-CPA, supra note 82, s 73; QC-Consumer Protection Regulation, supra 
note 154, ss 31.2, 33, 38-39.
253. (AB) High-Cost Credit Regulation, supra note 241, ss 14, 16; (BC) BC-BPCPA, supra note 124, 
s 112.21; (MB) MB-CPA, supra note 143, s 249; High-Cost Credit Products Regulation, supra note 
242, ss 9-11; (QC) QC-CPA, supra note 82, s 103.4; QC-Consumer Protection Regulation, supra note 
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that the high-cost credit product is high-cost credit” must be posted 
prominently in Manitoba and be included in the credit agreements in 
British Columbia, and in Québec if the consumer’s debt ratio is above 
forty-five per cent.254 Although not found in all four provinces, some 
regulations include prohibitions against various enticements to enter into 
a high-cost agreement, assignment of wages, early payment collection and 
direct access to a borrower’s bank account.255
Lastly, Alberta’s High-Cost Credit Regulation requires a high-cost 
credit business operator to provide information on the total value of all 
high-cost credit agreements, the number of agreements, the number of 
repeat agreements, the average size and term as well as the total value 
of agreements that have been defaulted by borrowers and that have been 
written off.256 Information such as this will provide valuable statistics 
with which  to assess the advantages and disadvantages of these types of 
products in the upcoming years and should be requested in every province 
to enlighten future reforms.
These new provincial legislative developments are positive 
developments for financial consumers in those provinces. Considering it 
took more than ten years before the last province enacted payday loans 
legislation, expectations for a national regulatory framework for high-
cost credit products must be tempered and adjusted to the realities of 
provincial legislative reform. The hope remains, however, that the trend 
to improve financial consumer protection will not only spread into all 
other jurisdictions, but also that all high-cost lenders in addition to payday 
lenders will be regulated and licensed across the country.257 
Conclusion
The preceding critical review of provincial legislation relating to consumer 
credit highlights the extent of provincial regulation on consumer credit 
and the importance it has played in the past and will continue to play in 
the future with respect to the protection of financial consumers. Provinces 
and territories demonstrably stepped in when the federal government 
154, s 61.0.5.
254. (BC) BC-BPCPA, supra note 124, s 112.21(2)(d); (MB) MB-CPA, supra note 143; (QC) QC-
CPA, supra note 82, s 103.4; Consumer Protection Regulation, supra note 154, ss 61.0.5–61.0.6.
255. (AB) AB-CPA, supra note 144, s 53; High-Cost Credit Regulation supra note 241, s 24(a), 24(l); 
(BC) BC-BPCPA, supra note 124, ss 112.22–112.23, 112.26, 112.28 (MB) High-Cost Credit Products 
Regulation, supra note 242, s 15(e).
256. (AB) High-Cost Credit Regulation, supra note 241, s 21. See also Nova Scotia and British 
Colombia requirements to provide annual data to regulators: (BC) Payday Loans Regulation, supra 
note 209, ss 4(2)(b), 4(3); (NS) Payday Lenders Regulations, supra note 209, s 5; Dilay & Williams, 
supra note 219 at 194-195.
257. Momentum, “Policy Options,” supra note 240.
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clearly abdicated its responsibility to regulate consumer credit in Canada. 
Notwithstanding the vast arsenal of provincial consumer protection 
measures, the preceding analysis reveals a clear lack of uniformity and 
confirms that some consumers are better protected than others despite 
the federal government’s recognition that “the fundamental interests and 
needs of consumers do not vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”258
It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify all gaps and deficiencies, 
and determine all best practices, within the provincial regulatory 
landscape. Further research is certainly warranted to address ongoing 
issues and shortcomings in the current legislative framework discussed 
herein. Comprehensive and detailed analyses of each type of consumer 
credit legislation is therefore recommended to continue to put pressure on 
policymakers and to advance proposals for reform so as to better protect 
financial consumers from unfair, deceptive, predatory and illegal lending. 
Some fundamental issues, however, transverse the variety of provincial 
legislative enactments and merit specific consideration in future research 
and reforms.
1. Focus on consumers instead of lenders
A historical perspective on evolving provincial legislation provides insight 
into the motivations of policymakers responsible for the regulation of 
consumer credit in Canada. Although the objective typically relates to 
consumer protection, public policy on consumer credit generally assumes 
that restricting access to high-cost credit will create more harm than 
protection for consumers and thus the continued availability of these 
products and services, even at extortionate rates, remains an ongoing 
concern.259 As such, the legal constraints on the industry and the financial 
consequences on the overall profitability of the industry remain at the 
forefront of considerations when evaluating legislative reform. Most 
research, government initiatives and legislative reforms have primarily 
focused on lenders, their practices, their products and services as well as 
their industry and its governance.
To complement these industry-driven consumer protection measures 
and to encourage consumers’ responsibility for their own financial well-
being, recent financial literacy initiatives and regulatory emphasis on 
transparency and disclosure requirements strive to empower consumers 
for self-protection.260 However, new research conducted by the Financial 
258. Canada, Reforming Canada’s Financial Services Sector (1999), supra note 80 at 66; Dilay & 
Williams, supra note 219 at 188.
259. Ibid at 185-187.
260. Kerton & Ademuyiwas, supra note 165 at 102-103; Waldron, “A Brief History,” supra note 32 
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Consumer Agency of Canada indicates that despite the concerted efforts 
of governments in Canada, these consumer protection measures do not 
seem to be achieving anticipated results since “[m]any payday loan 
users were unaware of the high costs of payday loans compared to their 
alternatives.”261 These findings are reminiscent of the Royal Commission 
on Prices report which concluded almost 70 years ago in 1949 that “[t]here 
is little doubt that the consumer is not aware of the interest cost equivalent 
of the alternative credit services offered to him.”262 
As previously explained, dependency on alternative financial services 
is expensive and, while not leading to insolvency for all borrowers, these 
loans do not help to improve a credit record nor promote financial stability. 
The regular exclusion of vulnerable consumers from mainstream financial 
institutions is a subject for which the current data are not sufficient to allow 
us to draw specific conclusions. Further research is therefore essential to 
address the needs of financial consumers263 and to “identify determinants 
of over-indebtedness,” financial exclusion, poverty and the recent growth 
in consumer insolvencies in Canada.264 
It has recently been suggested that as a society, we should rethink 
credit as a social provision for low income or financially distressed 
individuals.265 Since many consumers rely on high-cost credit for some 
of their basic needs, causes of these persistent economic shortfalls and 
financial exclusion from mainstream financial services providers must 
not only be regarded as an economic problem but a social one as well.266 
Additional and different questions must therefore be raised to determine 
optimum and sustainable solutions. Why are consumers using these 
products and in what circumstances? What are the economic and social 
consequences on individuals, their families and their communities? 
Are current alternative high-cost financial services appropriate or even 
at 320.
261. FCAC, Market Trends, supra note 191 at 1.
262. Royal Commission on Prices, Report, supra note 42 at 306.
263. Ontario, 2014 Payday Loans Report, supra note 213 at 25.
264. Barrett, Higher Cost Credit, supra note 163 at 100; Buckland & Visano, “Introduction,” supra 
note 191 at 37; Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, “Annual Consumer Insolvency 
Rates by Province and Economic Region,” online: OSB <www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/
br01820.html> [perma.cc/D2DP-BVB2]. J Douglas Hoyes, “Yes, We Have A Payday Loan Crisis” 
(updated for 2018), online (blog): Hoyes <www.hoyes.com/blog/yes-we-have-a-payday-loan-crisis/> 
[perma.cc/DVA9-M9VT].
265. Abbye Atkinson, “Rethinking Credit as Social Provision” (2019) 71:5 Stan L Rev 1093.
266. Ibid at 1161; Buckland, Hard Choices, supra note 15 at 163; Manitoba Public Utilities Board, 
supra note 191 at 39; Jerry Buckland, Chris Robinson & Brenda Spotton Visano, “Conclusion” in 
Buckland, Robinson & Visano, Payday Lending in Canada, supra note 18 at 231 [Buckland, Robinson 
& Visano, “Conclusion”].
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necessary since they reinforce inequality, indebtedness and poverty?267 
Are there alternative innovative solutions in either or both the public and 
the private sector?268
A Canadian study on payday loans, building upon Jerry Buckland’s 
previous research on financial exclusion, has recently examined several 
of these questions. Following an “in-depth and inter-disciplinary analysis 
of payday lending in Canada,” the authors recommend that, given the 
unethical practices of the industry and the exploitation of repeat borrowers, 
payday loans should be simply banned as they are in Québec given the 
cost of borrowing restrictions in the Province.269 Proposed alternatives are 
increasing access to other financial services offered by banks and credit 
unions such as savings accounts, small credit products and overdraft 
protection.270 These recommendations are certainly worthy of further 
consideration by policymakers.
2. Enforcement and licensing issues
The historical overview of provincial legislation relating to consumer 
credit further reveals a troubling tendency of provincial governments to 
lean on the judicial process to enforce their own regulations. Remedies 
and damages are provided in most statutes but are only available upon 
the consumer’s insistence to the Court that the act must be applied and 
enforced. Such passive enforcement of public statutes requires, however, 
that consumers bring the matter before the courts at their own expense to 
ensure that credit lenders comply with consumer protection provisions. 
Such an endeavour “requires a financial and educational status which 
many borrowers in the criminal market simply do not have.”271 Reliance 
upon the judicial system must be re-evaluated; giving voice to concerns 
about the effectiveness of remedies for financial consumers, access to 
justice issues, and the substantive, and not only symbolic, implementation 
of provincial legislation.272 
Mary Anne Waldron previously concluded that “the rights of the 
most vulnerable of our society can often times only be protected by the 
criminal law or active governmental enforcement of consumer protection 
regulations.”273 With illegal lenders flooding the consumer credit market 
267. See Buckland, Hard Choices, supra note 15 at 199-200.
268. See e.g. Visano, supra note 18 at chapter 6.
269. Buckland, Robinson & Visano, “Conclusion,” supra note 266 at 223-224, 233.
270. Ibid at 232-233.
271. Waldron, “What is to be Done,” supra note 205 at 379; Ziegel, “Consumer Credit Regulation,” 
supra note 2 at 492.
272. Belobaba, supra note 171 at 382.
273. Waldron, “What is to be Done,” supra note 205 at 379.
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and their total lack of compliance with consumer protection provisions, 
these remarks are all the more relevant today. The question remains 
whether existing regulatory agencies lack the legislative mandate or simply 
the appropriate resources to implement and enforce existing consumer 
protection legislation. 
Moreover, current administrative enforcement is generally focused on 
addressing consumer complaints rather than acting upon the government’s 
own initiative to investigate allegations of unfair, deceptive, or abusive 
practices in the industry. Following its research on best practices in financial 
consumer protection in Canada, the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada 
confirmed that in “some provincial-territorial jurisdictions, the regulator 
does not resolve individual complaints” but that “[c]omplaints received 
are used as a main monitoring tool to inform enforcement activities.”274 
Proactive investigations are conducted in some provinces predicated on 
the complaints received considering criteria such as:
• the number of individuals affected
• the vulnerability of the consumer
• an assessment of harm to the consumer or to the general public and 
to public confidence
• the seriousness of the breach, the history of the business and 
criminality. 275
 As such, administrative enforcement mechanisms relying on a complaint 
system are “only useful if people (1) know about the service and the 
regulations […] (2) know about the complaint mechanism” and are not 
discouraged by the length, complexity and effort involved in the process.276 
In Ontario, it was recommended that access to compensation for borrowers 
for harm resulting from statutory violations should be facilitated and that 
“[c]larifying and improving these processes could help consumers assert 
their consumer rights and manage their financial obligations and ensure 
that their basic needs are met.” 277
Emphasis should therefore be placed on reviewing the effectiveness 
and efficiency of existing provincial regulatory agencies and determining 
274. FCAC, Report on Best Practices in Financial Consumer Protection, (31 May 2017, published 
on 14 May 2018) at 12-14, online (pdf): FCAC <www.canada.ca/content/dam/fcac-acfc/documents/
programs/research-surveys-studies-reports/best-practices-financial-consumer-protection.pdf> 
[perma.cc/H928-VY7P].
275. Ibid at 13.
276. Buckland, Hard Choices, supra note 15 at 50, 165; Ontario, 2014 Payday Loans Report, supra 
note 213 at 24.
277. Ibid.
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the proper role of governments in the implementation and enforcement 
of their statutes. Among other things, protecting consumers involves 
putting in place measures to prevent or, at the very least, minimize unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive practices. For an outright prevention of consumer 
exploitation, measures must also be in place to protect consumers prior to 
transactions, not only after they have suffered harm caused by marketplace 
abuses.278
3. Responsible lending
Given the clear inequality of bargaining power and the resulting 
“imbalance between debtor and creditor responsibilities,”279 new 
regulatory measures are recommended as international standards and 
being developed to ensure that creditors cease their irresponsible lending 
practices and become responsible for the losses incurred by their actions. 
According to the G20 High-Level Principles on Financial Consumer 
Protection, financial services providers should work in the best interest 
of their customers and “assess the related financial capabilities, situation 
and needs of their customers before agreeing to provide them with a 
product, advice or service.”280 Likewise, the Good Practices for Financial 
Consumer Protection of the World Bank further recommends that criteria 
of suitability and affordability of the credit products or services be assessed 
prior to a credit transaction.281 
These components of responsible lending practices should also be 
extended to include an evaluation of the consumer’s ability to pay without 
undue hardship, in the sense that the increased indebtedness “does not cause 
undue economic hardship to a credit consumer” and “does not deprive 
him of the ability to support himself and his family.”282 As explained by 
Therese Wilson,
to focus on responsible borrowing, as opposed to lending, ignores the 
structural causes of over-indebtedness where consumers lack choice and 
must accept inappropriate, high-cost credit products in order to meet their 
278. Kerton & Ademuyiwas, supra note 165 at 95.
279. Ziegel, “Consumer Insolvencies,” supra note 34 at 385; Ziegel, “Consumer Credit Regulation,” 
supra note 2 at 490.
280. OECD, G20 High-Level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection, (2011) at 7 online: 
OECD <https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-markets/48892010.pdf> [https://perma.cc/CNG8-
TK6P].
281. The World Bank, Good Practices for Financial Consumer Protection (Washington: The World 
Bank, 2012) at 68 online (pdf): <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/583191468246041829/
Good-practices-for-financial-consumer-protection> [https://perma.cc/392D-8S77]: “Affordability 
looks at whether a consumer can afford additional debt obligations once the monthly income net of 
financial and living expenses (including rent or mortgage payments) is considered.”
282. Cuming, supra note 1 at 72.
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credit needs. It also ignores theories of behavioural bias, which hold that 
consumers will display overoptimism and overconfidence when entering 
into credit agreements.283
Legislative intervention is also justified as follows by Jacob Ziegel: 
There are other reasons as well that justify legislative intervention. 
Overindebtedness and irresponsible lending practices create externalities 
(social and financial costs) that affect the debtor’s family, the debtor’s 
other creditors, and the community at large. It may also jeopardize a 
country’s financial stability as may be seen from the current subprime 
mortgage credit crisis. It is these externalities that preclude the creditor 
from arguing that it should be able to take even large credit risks so long 
as it is also willing to absorb any losses. The answer to this reasoning is 
that if the lender is acting irresponsibly, it is not in fact internalizing all 
the losses.284
In Canada, Québec and Ontario have recently enacted limited responsible 
lending provisions requiring the lender not only to assess a borrower’s 
debt-ratio and ability to pay but to inform the potential client of the results. 
Legal consequences are prescribed encouraging a lender to consider the 
consumer’s financial circumstances and impact of increasing their level of 
indebtedness. At the federal level, a new Financial Consumer Protection 
Framework enacted by Parliament in 2018 but not yet in force includes a 
new suitability test requiring a bank to “establish and implement policies 
and procedures to ensure that the products or services in Canada that it 
offers or sells to a natural person other than for business purposes are 
appropriate for the person having regard to their circumstances, including 
their financial needs.”285 Although these are promising developments, 
more stringent responsible lending requirements are essential, along with 
the necessary research demonstrating their effectiveness and impact on 
financial consumers.
In comparison to other countries, responsible lending measures can 
take various legislative forms and should include economic incentives to 
lend responsibly.286 Upon entering into a credit agreement, a lender could be 
required to assess not only the consumer’s ability to pay but the suitability 
of the credit products considering the consumer’s financial capacity and 
283. Therese Wilson, “The Responsible Lending Response” in Therese Wilson, ed, International 
Responses to Issues of Credit and Over-indebtedness in the Wake of Crisis (Aldershot/GB: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2013) at 126. See also Ramsay, “Overindebtedness,” supra note 11 at 40.
284. Ziegel, “Consumer Insolvencies,” supra note 34 at 372.
285. Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 2, LC 2018, c 27, ss 316-319, s 329 adding Bank Act, 
supra note 151, s 627.06 (not in force yet).
286. Micheline Gleixner, “Financial Literacy,” supra note 158 at 615-637. 
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indebtedness as well as the object of the loan. Other responsible lending 
provisions exert pressure upon the lender to exercise caution with high risk 
debtors, since additional losses may be incurred should the consumer’s 
overindebtedness led to insolvency. Finally, an emphasis on corporate 
social responsibility through responsible lending requirements should 
stimulate financial innovation; producing new products and services 
designed to facilitate the repayment of loans, rather than the exploitation 
of the gradual increase of a consumer’s total indebtedness.
“The question is no longer whether lenders and credit grantors should 
be held responsible but how that principle can best be given legislative 
expression.” 287 As with initial disclosure of cost requirements in the 1960s, 
lenders have and will undoubtedly continue to contest and raise issues with 
implementation but eventually will accept the new consumer protection 
standard, adapt and innovate to the benefit of financial consumers.288
4. Recommended regulatory response
As described in this article, financial consumers in Canada face a “plethora 
of ‘service-specific’ acts” which, with the inclusion of federal legislation, 
results in a variety of different standards of consumer protection.289 This 
increasingly complex financial services legislative framework creates 
unnecessary confusion and misinterpretation of existing regulations 
especially for the most vulnerable consumers excluded from traditional 
federally regulated financial institutions.290 “In Canada consumers must 
also pay for any burden from lost scale economies or duplicate compliance 
in competing provincial jurisdictions. All of these developments point to 
the need to abandon the old ‘line of service’ approach to regulation to 
achieve something more general.” 291
The absence of a national uniform high-cost credit regulatory 
framework further represents a significant obstacle to inter financial 
institution collaboration required to address the issues of financial 
exclusion, including  access to credit and to mainstream banking services.292 
287. Ziegel, “Consumer Insolvencies,” supra note 34 at 394.
288. Ontario, Final Report 1965, supra note 2 at paras 235-282. See e.g. Canadian Bankers 
Association, Canada’s Financial Consumer Protection Framework: Consultation Paper (28 February 
2014) at 9-10, online (pdf): CBA <www.cba.ca/Assets/CBA/Documents/Files/Article%20Category/
PDF/sub_20140227_consumerprotection_en.pdf> [https://perma.cc/P62E-E3QT].
289. Kerton & Ademuyiwas, supra note 165 at 110.
290. Ibid at 110; Kerton, supra note 147 at 247.
291. Kerton, supra note 147 at 259-260.
292. Buckland, Robinson & Visano, “Conclusion,” supra note 266 at 232; Jerry Buckland, Summary 
of “Affordable Credit Options for Vulnerable Consumers,” for the Alternative Consumer Credit 
Market Working Group, Consumer Measures Committee (October 2009) at 7, online (pdf): Canada 
<https://www.feddevontario.gc.ca/eic/site/cmc-cmc.nsf/vwapj/ACCMBucklandReport.pdf/$FILE/
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A recent study on the payday lending industry explains the problem and 
offers a recommendation:
Restricting, reforming, or allowing fringe banks through state intervention 
are insufficient to address bank exclusion. A critical component to the 
solution to payday lending is that mainstream [financial institutions] 
identify the need, learn from current providers (i.e., the payday lenders), 
and put in place products that meet this need. This is not happening 
through the “market mechanism” so it is justifiable that the federal 
government steps in to engage with mainstream [financial institutions] 
to generate this outcome.293
In addition, it is important to note that the financial marketplace for 
consumers is evolving in response to technological advances as well as the 
increasing complexity of products and services including internet-based 
services and transactions.294 Considering that funds are moving through the 
Canadian economy at a faster pace than ever before, across provincial and 
national boundaries, and that digital financial services are international295 
with new illegal lenders operating outside provincial and even national 
jurisdictions, a new regulatory framework must be instituted in Canada. 
Reform at the federal level is already underway. In addition to federal 
cost of credit disclosure and transparency regulations applicable to all 
federally regulated financial institutions, the federal government has 
gradually reformed, during the last 30 years, the regulatory framework of 
the financial services industry in Canada. These reforms were undertaken 
in response to the consolidation and concentration of the financial services 
sector and its evolution towards larger domestic conglomerates expanding 
their services and products on a national level.296 Harmonizing and 
consolidating all consumer related provisions in the Bank Act, Parliament 
will further strengthen consumer protection when the newly enacted 
Financial Consumer Protection Framework comes into force.
Although provincial legislation still applies exclusively to provincially 
incorporated institutions, statistics confirm the tendency of financial 
institutions to migrate towards a federal incorporation. Some provinces 
ACCMBucklandReport.pdf> [https://perma.cc/SHF8-CF9N]; Puri & Nichol, supra note 15 at 459-
460.
293. Buckland & Visano, supra note 191 at 36-37.
294. Canada, Department of Finance, Supporting a Strong and Growing Economy: Positioning 
Canada’s Financial Sector for the Future: A Consultation Document for the Review of the Federal 
Financial Sector Framework, (26 August 2016) at 26, online (pdf): Canada <www.canada.ca/content/
dam/fin/migration/activty/consult/ssge-sefc-eng.pdf> [https://perma.cc/786E-54TN] [Canada, 
Consultation Document 2016]; Brean, supra note 11 at 150.
295. Kerton & Ademuyiwas, supra note 165 at 117.
296. Canada, Consultation Document 2016, supra note 294 at 23.
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have ceased to incorporate trust companies and the framework has been 
implemented allowing credit unions to be federally regulated.297 In fact, at 
the start of the new millennium, over ninety per cent of assets in the trust 
and loan, insurance and banking sectors were held by federally regulated 
financial institutions in Canada.298 With the exception of credit unions, 
the remaining provincial lenders are essentially companies operating in 
the alternative financial services market. Recent studies indicate, however, 
that many, if not most, high-cost credit lenders, including payday lenders, 
have corporatized and consolidated, as a natural progression of the 
industry and in response to new regulations.299 Licensing and supervision 
on a national level, especially with modern information technology in the 
digital era, should, therefore, no longer represent issues of concern for 
public enforcement.
Given the foregoing, provincial legislation is becoming less relevant 
and less likely to better protect financial consumers. The framework 
which has been in place since Confederation is no longer appropriate, and 
recent regulatory reforms might be a precursor to a single federal financial 
services act to implement a unified and national approach to the regulation 
of Canadian financial institutions large or small in the near future. As 
recommended by the Consumers Council of Canada: “[t]he code needs 
to be comprehensive across the entire financial sector and all financial 
products at federal, provincial and local levels and cover similar products 
in the same fashion.”300
Despite provincial jurisdiction over provincial companies and 
“Property and Civil Rights in the Province,” the Canadian Constitution 
clearly assigned Parliament the power to regulate “Banking” as well as 
“Interest” including consumer credit.301 Federal and provincial legislation 
have both recognized that interest represents the entire cost of a loan and 
relates accordingly to all loan transactions, including vendor’s credit.302  
297. Ibid at 10, 31. On 1 July 2016, Caisse populaire acadienne ltée of New Brunswick became the 
first federal credit union.
298. Canada, Reforming Canada’s Financial Services Sector (1999), supra note 80 at 65-66.
299. Manitoba Public Utilities Board, supra note 191 at 34-35; Buckland & Visano, supra note 191 at 
17.
300. Consumers Council of Canada, Submission to Finance Canada re: Canada’s Financial 
Consumer Protection Framework (28 February 2014) at 7, online (pdf): Canada <https://www.
canada.ca/content/dam/fin/migration/consultresp/fcpf-cpcpsf/082-fcpf-cpcpsf.pdf> [https://perma.cc/
F9VG-EAEK].
301. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 20, ss 91(19), 92(11), 92(13).
302. For an in-depth analysis of the federal constitutional jurisdiction over consumer credit see 
Gleixner, “Reconsidering Legislative Competence,” supra note 67 at 248-264. See also Jacob Ziegel, 
“Pass the buck: Ottawa has paramount jurisdiction over interest rate regulation,” Financial Post (10 
November 2006) online <https://www.law.utoronto.ca/news/article-ziegel-pass-buck> [https://perma.
760 The Dalhousie Law Journal
 As a result, consumer credit legislation should be considered a matter 
within Parliament’s jurisdiction, as it was for more than a hundred years. 
Consumer credit must no longer be viewed as a consumer protection issue 
but rather a finance issue including the financial stability of Canadians on 
both a microeconomic and a macroeconomic level.303 As recommended by 
the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance in 1964, a comprehensive 
consumer protection legislation under federal jurisdiction should therefore 
be prioritized.304
The financial consumer protection framework in Canada needs to be 
geared towards having a comprehensive financial consumer code which 
adopts basic principles such as commitment to consumers’ interests; 
facilitating access to financial services; ensuring significant levels of 
transparency; responsible business conduct; and practices by financial 
institutions and providing efficient avenues for redress.305
A national and centralized legislative framework would impose greater 
uniformity, offer greater protection for financial consumers, provide clear 
directives to the consumer credit industry and eliminate the unnecessary 
administrative duplication of public services as well as internal trade 
barriers, thereby fostering economic growth and prosperity for the 
industry and the country. Under the purview of the Financial Consumer 
Agency of Canada, the consolidation of provincial and federal initiatives 
regarding financial literacy, and enforcement of universal standards, rules 
and regulations, would further improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
public resources.306
Acting in the best interest of all Canadian financial consumers, the 
federal government should therefore not shy away from its responsibility 
to enact a truly national comprehensive financial consumer protection 
regime governing all types of consumer credit offered by all types of 
financial services providers whether they are federally or provincially 
regulated.
cc/HCW4-UESF].
303. Buckland, Hard Choices, supra note 15 at 169.
304. Royal Commission on Banking and Finance, supra note 2 at 382.
305. Kerton & Ademuyiwas, supra note 165 at 95. See also Ontario, Final Report 1965, supra note 2 
at para 287; Ziegel, “Consumer Credit Regulation,” supra note 2 at 490; Dilay & Williams, supra note 
219 at 188.
306. Kerton, supra note 147 at 259-260. Ziegel, “Consumer Insolvencies,” supra note 34 at 390.
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